Ирано-Иракская война

[Igor_k]

interesante que se ha puesto en acig.org:

Cita:
In 1982 the first Mig-23MFs were delivered to Iraq, with them came the R-23R/T missiles. Iraqi MF carried both R-23R/T at the same time. Iraqi MF were equipped with Saphir-23 radar which was generations ahead of the radar onboard the Mig-21bis/Mig-23MS. In 1983, the Mig-23MFs were participating in the air war with Iran on the southern front. They locked on Iranian fighthers from ranges of 30-35 kilometers. 1983 was not a busy year for the air war, so few air clashes between Iraqi and Iranian aircraft occured, very few, maybe less than 5 R-23s were fired claiming 2-3 Iranian F-4s and F-5s. The Iranian fighters tended to withdraw when locked upon by Iraqi Mig-23MF radar.

Iranian F-4 RWR were not capable of distinguishing the Mig-23MF radar charachteristics, niether were the AN/ALQ-101 and AN/ALQ-119 pods equipping it. No jamming was ever reported by Iraqi Mig-23MF pilots
In July 1984 the 63 squadron was equipped with Mig-23ML and In August 1984 one of its airplanes managed to shoot down an F-14 about 80 km deep over Iranian territory. During various skirmishes over Iranian territory and waters 1984-1988 the Mig-23ML managed to shoot down several F-4 Phantoms using R-24Rs. Iranian GCI usually never let their aircraft reach to a distance less than 30Km from Iraqi fighters. Total Iraqi R-24 fired would not exceed 50 by any meassure.

Constant maneovering were adopted by Iranian fighters mainly F-4s and F-14s to avoid the clash with Iraqi Mig-23MLs. Iraqi Mig-23s became the backbone of the Iraqi interceptor force after 1984, however they were late comers to the show, by 1984 the backbone of the IRIAF was broken, air superiority was gained. Iraqi Mig-23 were conducting routine CAP over the northern part of the Gulf, and over the Iranian cities of Ahvaz, Dezful and Kermanshah with no chalange from either the Iranian jets or air defence. To attest to their capabilities during 1983-1988 only one Mig-23MF and another Mig-23ML were lost to various Iranian assets.
One cannot compare the Iraqi experience with that of the Angolan just because there is no way to compare the South Africans pilots with the Iranian ones.

R-24T were used to a lesser extent because they were second options to Iraqi pilots and their lock on ranges were sometimes 60% from that of the R-24R. However the R-24R could lock-on a 10sq meter RCS from a range exceeding 50 km. The R-24T could lock on an SR-71 from 98km head-on and against a single piston engine aircraft the range drops to 8 km which was obvious. During various experimintation with these numbers, IrAF managed to verify some of them using Mig-21 as a known target and performing various lock on using both R-24R and T at different altitudes.

The Iraqi experience with Saphir radar was a reliable one and never there was a case when the radar failed during engagement. Iraqi R-24 R had no Inertial systems with radio corrections, R-27R supplied to Iraq had this capability.

It is important to analyse the Syrian experience carefully and draw the correct conclusions, maybe in that particular incident the Syrian pilot was trying to lock on an RPV with a reduced RCS, which caused big trouble not for Syrian pilots, but for Egyptians and Iraqis as well. An Iraqi Mig-23ML pilot tried to lock an Israeli RPV with his R-24R but that was useless so he maneovered and blasted it using an R-24T. Trying to lock-on Predators using R-24R/T,Magic from the same flight level was a waste of time. Only the Mig-25 locked on it in a LD mode using R-40RD.
Iraq was looking forward to replace its MIg-21/23 with SU-27 series and the Mig-25 with Mig 31 aircrafts. By summer 1990 these plans were hard to implement with the UN embargo.

The Saphir radar used a monopulse on recieve system which is a very powerful ECCM technique and I am not aware of any radar of this type that was effectively jammed even by the Americans to te extent that the screen is white. However AN/ALQ-131 jammers used VGPO techniques to prevent lock-on by R-24R on the aircraft carrying it be it an F-16 or an F-111.

Some of the information presented on this thred as based on "Iraqi experience" need to be corrected. The Mig-23MF/ML experience was a succesful one in Iraq. I really dont know the basis of the conclusions made on this experience. Iraq had 2 squadrons of Mig-23MLs and an OCU squadron of Mig-23MF, when needed it could be turned into a operational fighter squadron. the maximum number of Mig-23ML participting in any air battle during the war with Iran was four aircrafts, to say that more than that was shear fantsy by Iranian sources.

As for the battle that occured on Augus 11th 1984, the whole battle occured at an altitude of 4 kms. The first Iranian F-4E started maneovering before the firing of the first R-24R and the second F-4E was also maneovering before the launch of the R-24T and continued to do so after that. Analysis of the data after the battle that the Iraqi Mig-23ML should have chased the Iranian F-4E and that would have been the end of both F-4s, however the Iraqis were operating under strict GCI and they had already shot down an F-14, A senior Iraqi officer present in the GCI thought that they shouldnt continue their persuit.


Cita:
In April 1991,the Iraqi Air Force formed a committee to draw the necessary lessons from the 1991 Air war with the United States. In the field of Air to Air war it selected the Mig-23ML and Mig-25 PDS as the two fighters that would encounter the US aircrafts. The Iraqi Mig-29 had trouble with their engines and they were no longer in flying conditions for sustained periods. The Mirage F-1 was a good aircraft with modern equipment but the Matra Super 530 was no longer a match to modern US weapons and was very much susceptible to jamming.

Among many things that needed improvement were the situational awareness and the ECM equipment of the Mig-23ML. Iraq received its Mig-23ML in 1983 and used it for the first time in August 1984 against the Iranians. The Aircraft had a good radar and good armament but it had a miserable Radar Warning Reciever, the Sirena III. This RWR was capable of detecting late 1950s airborne radar only. In 1993-1996 there was a tremendous effort to modernise the Mig-23ML by equipping it with SPO-15 RWR. This was the best the Iraqis had. SU-22 M4 were stripped of their SPO-15 and the system was installed on the Mig-23ML. Chaff and Flare system of the KDS type were also taken from the same aircrafts and again installed on the Mig-23ML. To protect the Mig-23ML from newly introduced AIM-120 Amraam the Iraqi Mig-23ML were equipped with French manufactured Remora Active Self protection Jamming pods. These pods were originally received in 1984 along with the Mirage F-1 batch of that year. The Remora was successfully used against all types of Iranian aircraft. In 1988 the Iraqi air force EW department modified the Remora pod to make it capable of breaking the lock by F-15, F-16 radars. The French experts on this pod who worked in Iraq were aware of this modification but decided not to raise any complaint.The remora pod is a self contained jammer which doesn’t need any interface with the aircraft avionics. In the mid 1990s there were several experiments with the adaptation of that pod on the Mig-23ML. The same pod was also modified to be carried on the Iraqi Mig-29 which had its engine partially rehabilated by russian experts who visited Iraq for a small period.

The Remora pod proved itself several times when the aircrafts carrying it defeated AIM-120 launched by US F-16s. Iraqi radio intercepts of US pilot communication has clearly shown that they were aware of the presence of some sort of jamming . he told the AWACS controller that there were some pulses visible on his radar screen (in the F-16 cockpit) and that he doesn’t think the AMRAAM he has launched is going to find its target.
After Operation Desert Fox December 16-19, 1998 and during all air skirmishes occuring in the skies of Iraq. The Mig-23ML was carrying the remora pod always. In the year 2000, the Mig-23ML was equipped with US GPS system (Civilian code) and that system was linked to the navigation and guidance of that plane so it can guide it in an automatic pre programmed flight.

_________________

[Igor_k]

Ув.Transit
Вы читали посты Ахмада Рушди на форуме томакупера?Соответственно, могли бы их прокомментировать?
http://www.s188567700.online.de/foru...=2382&start=90
и следующий

[Transit]

Вы читали посты Ахмада Рушди на форуме томакупера?

Igor_k, я не зарегистрирован там. Кстати, здесь тоже есть пользователь из ирака, но он давненько не появляется.

[Sveto]

I am looking for photos of these iraqi birds
MiG-23ML
23269(cn25056)
23282

MiG-21bis
21186
21168
21198
21204
21206
21174
21177
21190
21138
21285
Most of them were used extensively durring that war

[Transit]

Most of them were used extensively durring that war

This birds stored in Serbia? Do you have acess to technical log book?

[Sveto]

Yes these are now in Serbia ,i am wondering are there any photos of these planes from Iraqi Air bases?
P.S. Right now i do not have acces to tehnical books but i had seen some of them before.

[Igor_k]

еще из Ахмада РушдиPosted: Sat Oct 08, 2005 12:06 pm Post subject:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tom,
I would like to point to the fact that the Iranian government never cared about the Iranian AF after 1979. It looked at it as an organization that was loyal to the Shah of Iran; there was a tendency to throw Iranian pilots to meet their fate at the hands of Iraqi AD and fighters.
It would be interesting to discover the reason why the Iranian government all of a sudden cared about what remained of its AF after 1983. The decision to use it for "defensive purposes" while the Iranian ground forces were committing offensive operations in 1983-1987 meant that the Iranian government had decided to let their ground forces be at the mercy of the Iraqi AF, if that decision ever occurred then it was a strange decision by any logic!
Even before 1983, the Iranian air force performance was mediocre by any standard. Take for example the celebrated raid on H-3 which is hailed by many Iranian contributors to this forum as a proof of Iranian efficiency and in fact was nothing but a dismal failure. No sane man, to speak nothing of a junior officer in the planning dept. of any AF in the world, would ever send eight F-4E aircrafts plus the tankers needed to refuel them for a trip of more than 1000 km either way and in the end the only thing you achieve is hitting a Mig-21 on the ground with two bullets. That Mig-21 was easily repaired and flew the next day. Again one of the F-4E that participated in the raid was damaged and landed in a Syrian AB. Ask LP, he knows about all the details but he pretends otherwise.
By 1984-1985 Iraqi CAPs were flying over Kermanshah, Ilam, Dezful, Ahwaz, and Bandar Khomaini... any other place I missed. Iraqi Mig-25 was attacking Tehran 6-8 times/ day unchallenged. Iraq started using Mi-8/17 helicopters to drop bombs on Iranian front troops. Iraq used unescorted IL-76 planes to drop napalm pallets on Iranian troops at the front. Iraq started a campaign to attack economical targets all over Iran; just name the place. For all of these actions; Please give me a name other than Air Supremacy for Iraq. In all of these cases where were the F-14s, F-4s and F-5s taking the "defensive posture"?
I don’t have to talk to Iranian war vets, these people knew that a trip to Iraq meant one thing; a free ticket to an Iraqi POW camp. Just see the caption on so many Iranian contributors to the ACIG "to those who didn’t return back" they meant to the Iranian pilots who didn’t return back didn’t that mean so much to you?
Now trying to explain a 95% empty glass as being full of 5% of water and then being optimistic, well that would be an interesting explanation.
I thought the job of an air force was to shoot as much enemy aircraft as possible and that the Iranian F-14 pilot could zap the "poor" and "less sophisticated" Mig-23 from a range of say 50 km outside the range of the R-24. No, the Iranians preferred the unescorted SU-22 and Mig-23BN. Another wrong statement by the Iranians, the Iranian F-14 didn’t shoot down more than 8 Iraqi fighters during the whole war. What the F-14 clique in the headquarters in Tehran did was is that they stole the shooting down of Iraqi fighters by other means and claimed it was by their F-14.
The Iranian strategy to counter the Iraqi air force was flawed from day one. The Iranian pilots were under motivated, under morale, under trained and under equipped.
Again the repetition of this myth of US support which is totally nonsense; excuse me for the expression. I don’t mean you in person but I mean this leverage the Iranian is using to cover their deficiency and in the meantime belittle the Iraqi AF efficiency. Again I thought that Iran gate was a Martian endeavor
As for the Mig-23BN you mention, the forty or so I summed to you covered the whole war and was shot down by all Iranian means. Only a trickle was by air to air.
Again this argument of yours of the Iraqi air force not taking off and fighting in 1991 is entirely not true and I didn’t mention or meant to mention the word "cowardice" so why do you put words I didn’t say in my mouth.
Tom,
There is no way you can compare the battle in 1982 between the Iraqi AF vs. Iranian AF with the 1991 USAF, USN, USMC and the RAF vs. Iraqi AF. The comparison is not logical in the ratio of numbers, equipment….etc.
You know that the Iraqi AF had a limited plan to intercept and that Iraqi fighters took of and were able to shoot down coalition aircrafts and were shot down themselves. In the end what stopped them was the collapse of the IADS.
Tom,
When I began posting in the ACIG I thought that it was a free forum where many would welcome what I write in an open minded way, and discuss it thoroughly, even if it contradicts what they know. We (I and you) managed some fairly balanced, frank and sincere discussion and reached some interesting conclusions. The way some people posted (and I don’t mean you) their full of hate reply in this thread would certainly confirm "that old habits hardly die".
The Iraqi Air Force had defeated its Iranian adversary piecemeal in the war 1980-1988. The lack of proficiency of Iranian pilots contributed greatly to this defeat, the reasons were both subjective and objective. Stories about this could fill a book.

Back to top


Ahmad Rushdi
Honourable Member


Joined: 17 Jan 2005
Posts: 376
Location: BAGHDAD
Posted: Sat Oct 08, 2005 12:08 pm Post subject:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Cold0,
If this is your idea of argument then how are we going to find the truth? If we stick to declared losses during the war then all air forces during the history of air warfare were nothing but groups of liars. The USAF have declared during the 1991 war that its F-15C had shot 40 Iraqi aircraft then after several years the USAF lowered the number to 31 and that was due to extensive research, analysis, and the availability of new information, so you are now accusing the USAF of lying during the war. The real number from the Iraqi side is 17 aircrafts only, but then I didn’t call the USAF lying. This is how it goes in the real war, during the war one side declares a certain number of enemy casualties, and then after the war the number is revised and goes down. Then if the opportunity is available; the two former adversaries compare notes and we might end with a new number; even lower. This has been the case in all wars, and it is very evident in this forum if you kindly read the October 1973War thread. The USAF interestingly and only a couple of years ago revised its Korean AA kills, the number was dramatically changed.

Crossiathh,
A very good question, the performance of the R-24R against maneuvering targets wasn’t that good. The soviets seemed to have known this fact. After two or three combat incidents when F-4E and RF-4E pilots performed sharp horizontal turns and then a steep dive the R-24R lost track. That was usually in the airspace over the north Gulf where the Iranians had GCI coverage. To counter the enemy aircraft maneuvering, soviet written instructions in the R-24 manual; was to let the enemy target move to the middle of the killing zone boundaries of the R-24R as displayed on the Mig-23ML HUD( a sort of No Escape Zone) then the R-24R was to be launched followed six seconds later by the R-24T. This ensured a higher Pk.
Iraqi Mig-23MF/ML were equipped with Serena-III RWR which was capable of detecting lock on by F-4 and F-5 radar, however not by F-14 radar. Here it is interesting to note that there were very few encounters between the Iraqi Mig-23MF/ML and the Iranian F-14. In summer 1984 when the Mig-23Ml was introduced it managed to shoot down an Iranian F-14, 80 km inside Iran using an R-60 MK. This occurred in August 1984, when 1st Lt. Amer managed to shoot down the F-14 flown by Colonel Hashim Ali Agha over the Iranian town of Bandar Mahshahar.
The Mig-23MS was a terrible aircraft. The version exported to Iraq in 1974 was equipped with Almaz-23 radar (an entirely useless piece of equipment) and R-3S missile (not the R-13M). Iraqi AF was discouraged by its performance and that’s was one of the reasons why Iraq went to the French in 1977 and bought the Mirage F-1. In 1980, when the war with Iran broke out there was one squadron of Iraqi of Mig-23MS, the 39th and the Iraqi AF had to commit it to combat. Iraq lost only3 Mig-23 MS during the war. With the introduction of the Mirage F-1 in summer 1981 the Mig-23MS was withdrawn from CAP duties over the front line and was performing CAP deep inside Iraq. With the arrival of the Mig-23MF in late 1982 the Mig-23MS was transformed into an OCU squadron and no longer performing combat duty of any form.
As for the number of Mig-23MF/ML losses in the whole war, I can assure you that there was one Mig-23MF lost and another Mig-23ML lost only. However nobody seems to be interested in going into a dialogue that would eventually lead to the revision of the grossly inflated numbers of Iraqi shot down aircraft.

Back to top

[Transit]

еще из Ахмада Рушди: ... I can assure you that there was one Mig-23MF lost and another Mig-23ML lost only.

Слабо верится, что потеряли только по одному истребителю этих модификаций. И это за несколько лет интенсивной эксплуатации в боевых условиях! В остальном мнение Рушди выглядит достаточно взвешенным и многое можно подтвердить иранскими источниками (посадка в Сирии при атаке Н-3, применение Ил-76 над полем боя).

Заявлено уничтожение более 80 воздушных целей, половина из которых на счету ЗРК "Хок". Выше мы уже отметили, что Ирак признал потерю 20 машин за несколько больший отрезок времени чем длилась вся операция.

Нашёл более точные заявления сторон: за время операции "Кербела-5" иранские силы претендуют на 88 вражеских самолётов, ирак признал потерю 12 машин (т.е. в семь раз меньше). В среднем у ВВС Ирака получается одна боевая потеря на 400-500 боевых вылетов в январе-феврале 1987 г.

[Transit]

Мохаммад Заре Немати (у нас он отмечен в потерях за 18.09.1980, но возможно точная дата 8.09.1980)

Нашелся в сети такой артефакт:

[Transit]

Двое пропавших без вести с иракской стороны:
1-й лейтенант Манхаль Казим Джасим аль-Баяти (30.07.1960 г.р. см.фото) был летчиком Миража Ф-1, катапультировался над морем 13-го октября 1986 года во время боевого вылета.
1-й лейтенант Маджид Мухамед Науруз Саид (12.09.1961 г.р.) был сбит курдами над областью Так Так, севернее Киркука в 1987 году. Пилотировал самолет PC-7 (выше затрагивали вопрос о их боевом применении). Считается, что был взят в плен силами Талабани, который сейчас сам безуспешно пытается уточнить судьбу своего пленника.

[Transit]

Пилотировал самолет PC-7

Еще "подкинули" интересные данные по боевому применению РС-7: во время отражения иранского наступления весной 1985 года на южном секторе фронта в боевых действиях использовались самолеты РС-7 воздушной академии (факультет армейской авиации). Пилотирование осуществляли курсанты допущенные к самостоятельным полетам, а лидерами групп были летчики-инструкторы. Основными целями служили легкие плавсредства и места сосредоточения пехоты, против которых использовались контейнеры с напалмом, подвесные блоки неуправляемых ракет и огонь бортовых 12.7-мм пулеметов. Особо отличился курсант 2-го (!) курса Ya3rab Hashimi, которому была засчитана победа над вражеским реактивным истребителем пытавшимся его атаковать (Хашими был награжден и досрочно получил звание лейтенант, вышел в отставку в звании полковника. Его имя мне назвали только потому, что он уже погиб - после падения режима Хуссейна занимался политической деятельностью и был убит неизвестными на улице).

[Igor_k]

Тот же Ахмад Рушди описывал еще более оголтелые случаи -использование в качестве бомберов Ил-76 и Ми-8.Что интересно -без потерь

[Transit]

Тот же Ахмад Рушди описывал еще более оголтелые случаи -использование в качестве бомберов Ил-76 и Ми-8.Что интересно -без потерь

Да, отмечены единичные случаи применения Ил-76 прямо над полем боя в 1988 году. Иранцы связывают это с распылением ОВ.

Вот относительно свежая статья индийского летчика-инструктора работавшего в Ираке. В ней отражены два интересных момента - в марте 1982 года прибыли с КВР 6 МиГ-21Ф-13 (№526, 527, 531, 533, 536 и 537), т.е. истребители этой модификации оставались на вооружении 27-й эскадрильи еще минимум пару лет. А в июле 1983 года прибыла первая партия из 14 китайских F-7B (№№ 6505-6518).

[Transit]

14.09.1983 самолет ВВС Турции F-100F-10-HC 56-3903 из 182 Filo во время учебно-тренировочных полетов с авиабазы Диярбакыр случайно вторгся в воздушное пространство Ирака (отказ навигацтонного оборудования) и был сбит иракским истребителем Mirage F-1EQ 79-й эскадрильи ракетой Matra Super 530F-1. Оба летчика удачно катапультировались и были возвращены на родину через 1.5 месяца. Довольно любопытная победа Миражей подтвержденная Турецкой стороной!

[Transit]

Выдержки из лётной и записной книжек лейтенанта Ардестани (лётчик F-5E 21-й эскадрильи TFB.2 Тебриз):

Дата персидская/перевод даты/место и цель атаки/состав группы
01.07.1959 23.09.1980 Мосул военная база
02.07.1959 24.09.1980 Киркук группа: Хадем (№1), Эскандари (№2), Авшаль (№3), Ардестани (№4)
03.07.1959 25.09.1980 Эрбиль электростанция группа: Шариати (№1), Ардестани (№2)
05.07.1959 27.09.1980 мост
06.07.1959 28.09.1980 Мосул группа: Ардестани (№1), Наджафи (№2)
06.07.1959 28.09.1980 Сулеймания гарнизон
07.07.1959 29.09.1980 Киркук
08.07.1959 30.09.1980 Эрбиль группа: четвёркой (Ардестани №4)
09.07.1959 01.10.1980
09.07.1959 01.10.1980
09.07.1959 01.10.1980
10.07.1959 02.10.1980 группа: парой (Ардестани №1)
10.07.1959 02.10.1980 группа: парой (Ардестани №1)
11.07.1959 03.10.1980 Дехлоран
11.07.1959 03.10.1980
13.07.1959 05.10.1980 Чанан группа: Ардестани (№1), Дехаргани (№2)
14.07.1959 06.10.1980 Альмара мост
14.07.1959 06.10.1980 Альмара станция
20.07.1959 12.10.1980 Карун мост, танки
20.07.1959 12.10.1980 патрулирование
21.07.1959 13.10.1980
22.07.1959 14.10.1980
23.07.1959 15.10.1980 Хорремшехр
24.07.1959 16.10.1980 10 км Фао позиции пехоты группа: Абрахами (№1), Ардестани (№2)
24.07.1959 16.10.1980 10 км Фао повторная атака
26.07.1959 18.10.1980 перелёт в Тебриз
29.07.1959 21.10.1980 Сулеймания сброс листовок группа: Ардестани (№1), Лотфали (№2)
30.07.1959 22.10.1980 Хадж Омран гарнизон
01.08.1959 23.10.1980 Эрбиль гарнизон группа: Занжани (№1), Ардестани (№2)
02.08.1959 24.10.1980 Бане сложные метеоусловия группа: Хабиби (№1), Ардестани (№2)
04.08.1959 26.10.1980 Равандуз мосты (неудачно) группа: Ардестани (№1), Агаси (№2)
06.08.1959 28.10.1980 Киркук ж.д. станция группа: Шарифи (№1), Ардестани (№2)
06.08.1959 28.10.1980 месторождение группа: четвёркой (Ардестани №2)
08.08.1959 30.10.1980 Дукан плотина группа: Хоссейнпур (№1), Ардестани (№2)
08.08.1959 30.10.1980 группа: Ардестани (№1), Наджафи (№2), Хоссейнпур (№3), Аббасаид (№4)
14.08.1959 05.11.1980 Панджевин гарнизон группа: Мозафари (№1), Ардестани (№2)
22.08.1959 13.11.1980 гарнизон группа: парой (Ардестани №1)
23.08.1959 14.11.1980 Мосул месторождение группа: Наджафи (№1), Ардестани (№2). Неудачно, потребовался повторный удар:
24.08.1959 15.11.1980
Цель атаки: нефтяные хранилища юго-восточнее Мосула
Подвеска: по 4 бомбы среднего калибра
Расчетное время атаки 13:30, время выруливания на старт 13:02
Группа: Полковник Мохаммад Данешпур (№1), Л-т Мустафа Ардестани (№2), К-н Ядолла Шериф Раад (№3), Л-т Парвиз Забихи (№4)
Описание: после взлёта набор 12 000фт, атака с пикирования с высоты 9 000фт, отход на малой высоте и большой скорости в сторону турецкой границы. Отмечен огонь ЗА в догон. На отходе №3 наблюдал вражеские МиГ-23, затем вспышку за собой на земле, после чего №4 на вызовы по радио не отвечал. Вероятные причины потери F-5E л-та Забихи - огонь ЗА 57-мм, атака МиГ-23 или столкновение с землёй.
25.08.1959 16.11.1980 гарнизон группа: Ардестани (№1), Рахими (№2). №2 обстрелян в догон ракетами ЗРК, ушел.
30.08.1959 21.11.1980 электроподстанция группа: парой (Ардестани №1). Отказ двигателя у ведомого.
04.09.1959 25.11.1980 Киркук авиабаза группа: четвёркой (Ардестани №2)
05.09.1959 26.11.1980 Хсарти антенна связи
05.09.1959 26.11.1980
Цель атаки: электро-энергетические сооружения у Сулеймании
Группа: к-н Ядолла Шериф Раад (№1), л-т Занжани (№2), л-т Абулхассан Абулхасани (№3), л-т Ардестани (№4)
Описание: во время отхода от цели дважды атакованы вражескими парами МиГ-ов. Сбит по очереди №2, а затем №3, оба лётчика погибли.
18.09.1959 09.12.1980 Дабус гарнизон Составом четвёрки
18.09.1959 09.12.1980 Киркук НПЗ
28.09.1959 19.12.1980
Группа: К-н Ядолла Шериф Раад (№1), К-н Аббасид (№2), Мустафа Ардестани (№3). У №4 произошел отказ навигационного оборудования и он был отстранен от вылета
Условия: сложные метеоусловия, слоистая облачность
Описание: после пересечения иракской границы №3 обнаружил пару МиГ-23 заходящую в хвост, по курсу ведущий обнаружил ещё одну пару МиГ-ов. Группа распалась и №2 с №3 возвращались на базу с малым остатком топлива на высоте 25 000 фт. № 1 на базу не вернулся (сбит ракетой В-В, катапультировался над территорией иракского курдистана, позже вывезен вертолётом и долго лечился в госпиталях).
29.09.1959 20.12.1980 ПСС (поиск лётчика сбитого 28.09.59) группа: Бейкмухаммади (№1), Ардестани (№2)
04.10.1959 25.12.1980
_________________________________
Итого 49 боевых вылетов за 1980 год.

[МиГ-23]

http://www.afwing.com/combat/Iranian...n_action-9.htm
здесь мы видим некоторые фотографии из иракских самолетов, сбитых
Заголовок говорит, МиГ-23 сбит AIM-54, МиГ-21 обломков

[Igor_k]

Да,давно мечтал выучить китайский язык

[МиГ-23]

Да,давно мечтал выучить китайский язык

Вы говорите по-испански? Я люблю русский самолет, но я не верю, чтобы многое из западных источников о борьбе с записями этой статьи является переводом книги западных, они всегда говорят плохо о русских самолетов
http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/otvaga2004/wars1/wars_09.htm

[Igor_k]

Нет,по-испански я не говорю.Что касается западных источников,то просто так не ответишь -уж если мы тут,на российских форумах спорим.Но,думаю,основная причина,все-таки -именно отсутствие достоверной информации,ведь судят по экспортным образцам

[Transit]

большинство иракских документов уничтожено в 2003 году

Часть документов попавших в руки американцев была использована ими для весьма любопытного отчёта. Тем кто интересуется операцией "Буря в Пустыне" рекомендую прочесть.
Здесь есть информация о разведывательных полётах иракских МиГ-25РБ над Кувейтом (с фотографиями), таблицы наличного состава ВВС Ирака до операции и после неё, описание хода боевых действий в иракской перспективе и т.д.
Вот этот файл.
Обычно у нас принято считать что Ираку поставили 24 Су-24, но в приведённом документе указано 30 машин (см.таблицу стр.373), в свое время спрашивал у знающих людей какая цифра верна? Подтвердили 30, из которых 24 перелетели в Иран, 5 были уничтожены в ЖБУ на аэродроме в одном из первых ударов сил коалиции и ещё 1 не смог перелететь в Иран из-за отказа оборудования. Вот более полная раскладка по Сушкам. Для её составления использованы документы Иракского МИД-а с перечнем бортовых номеров перелетевших в Иран самолётов (см. прикреплённый файл). Для сквозной нумерации у Су-24 не хватает ровно 6 машин (это и есть 5 уничтоженных и 1 уцелевший - 24635/37/38/42/46/50 ).