War experience 1967-1968 ,Vietnam

[Хы]

Единственное - на основе чего Вы лично сделали заключение, что ВВС СССР не мог сделать осмысленных выводов из Вьетнамской войны?
Не по тому ли, что у ВВС не было чем мыслить?

Потому что у ВВС не было системы сбора информации о зарубежных войнах. Советники ездили и даже иногда участвовали в боевых действиях, но большая часть информации оседала в архивах, в лучшем случае. Мне известен такой пример - о достоинствах и недостатках МиГ-21 писали отдельные люди, в некоторых случаях даже не знавшие о существовании друг друга. Из-за такого бардака ВВС не могли ничего толком понять.

Откуда же тогда отчеты, анализы, и эти 2%, при том с четким обоснованием?
Неужели для того, чтобы понять насколько вкусна каша необходимо в ней вариться?

С уважением,
Хы.

[Viggen]

Откуда же тогда отчеты, анализы, и эти 2%, при том с четким обоснованием?
Неужели для того, чтобы понять насколько вкусна каша необходимо в ней вариться?

С уважением,
Хы.

Видимо делали тоже, что и я. Я писал отчет о МиГ-21, руководствуясь собственными предтсвлениями, представлениями коллег и используя выдержки из отчетов. В итоге я написал что было "по идее", вместо реального анализа боевого опыта.
Российским и советским организациям в основном надо "вариться", из-за катастрофических упущений в организации передачи и анализа информации.

[milstar]

Dear Sir

You wrote - Потому что у ВВС не было системы сбора информации о зарубежных войнах. Советники ездили и даже иногда участвовали в боевых действиях, но большая часть информации оседала в архивах, в лучшем случае. Мне известен такой пример - о достоинствах и недостатках МиГ-21 писали отдельные люди, в некоторых случаях даже не знавшие о существовании друг друга. Из-за такого бардака ВВС не могли ничего толком понять

Your statement possible false .As you knew some from Spanian war
belong to secret .

Intelligence , Army and VPK have limited quantity of persons ,which
have access to modern high secret information.But they exist .

SWR,GRU,CNII MO ,Manufacturer

Chief of related department of CNII MO /VVS as example/
possible had and have access to highly classified related information ,but not each adviser.

your respectfully

[Viggen]

Chief of related department of CNII MO /VVS as example/
possible had and have access to highly classified related information ,but not each adviser.

Это в теории. В реальности у меня был допуск ко всем документам МО на любые темы, за исключением совсем специальных архивов где ничего на тему Вьетнама не было в любом случае. Все анализы, написанные после Вьетнамской войны, я держал в руках.

[Viggen]

Your statements is false .

Как Вам угодно :) .

Кстати, на русском Вы писать не в состоянии?

[sss]

Кстати, на русском Вы писать не в состоянии?

Он даже на английском не в состоянии

и входить под своим логином ему лень (как он сам написал - "для экономии времени")

ему только постить огромные куски текста не лень...

[milstar]

sss wrote -

Он даже на английском не в состоянии

и входить под своим логином ему лень (как он сам написал - "для экономии времени")


Dear Sir

In this point you are full right .

Multiple USA contact persons from different companies understand
author and for author that is enough .

Russian agency,companies also understand author russian/ In scholl have only "2"/

That is ful correct with military principle -objective's ,concetration,
economy of the force &

This direction ,which is not decisive ,not more involvement
as reasonable.


Your respectfully

[Viggen]

In this point you are full right .

Multiple USA contact persons from different companies understand
author and for author that is enough .

Russian agency,companies also understand author russian/ In scholl have only "2"/

Your respectfully

Ну, Буш с Жириновским Вас может и понимают, а за остальных я бы не ручался.

[sss]

Russian agency,companies also understand author russian/ In scholl have only "2"/

В таком случае, будьте любезны писать ПО-РУССКИ
Я Вам уже говорил, что здесь русскоязычный форум

Кстати, входя в качестве "гостя" Вы реально никакой экономии не получаете, поскольку есть опция "запомнить логин" - в этом случае все происходит автоматически

[milstar]

Dear Sir


You wrote -

Ну, Буш с Жириновским Вас может и понимают, а за остальных я бы не ручался.

No intent .Suspect ,that they both not readed Klausewitz ,Adm.Mahan , N.Machiavelli ,Napoleon .

And 90% of USA senat ,Russian Duma allso not .

But if you wish ,we can disscuss in term of Gorgias

1. Nothing exist

http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/g/gorgias.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gorgias

Alsov Protagor,Diogen ,Critij

Protagor -
How strong argument can be made week?
How good biography can be made worst
How weak argument can be made strong ?
How worst biography can be made good ?

Critij -If religion / political theory -author of posting/ not
exist ,that she must be created to manage people's

or Confucij point 4 Affidavit -"Person,which think that State
decadent is ,must be sentenced to dead penalty"

Confuzij loosed the power ,as not used complex of
political instruments . But each state today tryed to
create society ,which not think .


Your respectfully

[milstar]

One of USA point of view

http://www.rand.org/paf/

What Is the Future of Striking First in U.S. National Security Strategy?
Key findings
Large-scale first strikes like Operation Iraqi Freedom will likely remain rare.
Emphasis on striking first does not require a major shift in planning.
A first-strike strategy requires outstanding strategic intelligence.
U.S. first-strike strategy may have unintended consequences.

When national leaders recast U.S. national security policy following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, they announced that, in the future, the United States would take advantage of opportunities to strike at potential adversaries before they attack. This doctrine of “preemption” actually includes two elements. True preemptive attack occurs when a country strikes an enemy to foil or mitigate the effects of an imminent attack against it (such as when Israel struck Egyptian airfields at the beginning of the Six Day War in 1967). Preventive attack, which is historically more common, involves striking an enemy to avert an apparently inevitable threat from materializing in the longer term (such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq). Because the enemy’s future intentions are rarely certain, preventive attacks are difficult to justify as being necessary for self-defense — yet not acting to prevent a potentially catastrophic threat may appear unacceptably dangerous. Although U.S. leaders occasionally considered striking adversaries first before 2001, they rarely carried out such attacks, and had never done so on such a scale before Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

How likely is the United States to carry out first strikes in the future? What are the implications of this policy for U.S. military capabilities and planning? RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) studied the potential role of striking first in the contemporary security environment, drawing on historical cases in which countries have either contemplated or carried out first strikes. Researchers drew the following conclusions:

Large-scale first strikes like OIF are likely to remain infrequent. The United States is more likely to consider first strikes than it was before the recent policy shift, but the factors that have discouraged such attacks in the past continue to apply. Many threats are difficult to anticipate, and even when opportunities exist to strike first, the potential military advantages are usually small compared to the anticipated political costs at home and abroad. The failure of intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapon programs and the costs of the continuing insurgency there will also make similar operations seem less palatable in the future.
The strategic emphasis on striking first does not require a major shift in U.S. defense planning. Even when the United States chooses to strike first, the military requirements will be case-specific. The forces needed to strike potential state adversaries would vary widely, and each would be very different from those needed to strike nonstate terrorist groups. In each case, the military capabilities required would be largely the same whether the United States struck first or second. If anything, military requirements tend to be less demanding in a first-strike scenario because the United States would have the advantage of dictating the terms of the fight.
A first-strike strategy requires outstanding strategic intelligence. Although any military strategy suffers if intelligence about the enemy is deficient, preemptive and preventive attacks are especially dependent on understanding the enemy’s intentions and capabilities. The difficulty of gathering such intelligence and making accurate predictions can be reduced but not eliminated. The U.S. Air Force’s traditional focus on strategic attack should place the service in the forefront of thinking about how to gather and analyze such information more effectively.
U.S. first-strike strategy may have unintended consequences. States or other actors expecting to be attacked by the United States may perceive powerful incentives to strike first; dangerous though it is to start a war with the world’s only superpower, allowing the United States to attack on its own terms is likely to be seen by such actors as an even worse alternative. The United States can discourage such threats by designing forces, basing architectures, and deployment schemes that minimize the U.S. military’s vulnerability to preemptive attacks by its adversaries.
These conclusions suggest that the new emphasis on striking first in U.S. national security policy since September 11, 2001, is not likely to produce a correspondingly great change in the shape or use of American military power in the future.


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[milstar]

DISTRIBUTION A:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Published Aerospace Power Journal - Spring 1998


Did USAF Technology Fail in Vietnam?
Three Case Studies*
Kenneth P. Werrell

IN EARLY APRIL 1997, the Air Force rolled out the F-22 stealth fighter. This highly sophisticated and very expensive aircraft carries the promise of continued American air dominance into the next century. The decision to use it for that purpose commits the Air Force, and the country, to a specific technology. Is this wise?

If history is any guide, the American record with military aviation technology is mixed at best. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, American airmen have not enjoyed overwhelming technological superiority in their conflicts. During World War I, US airmen flew European-designed, and, in most cases, European-built aircraft. In the early stages of World War II, Americans were shocked to learn that the Japanese Zero was better than the best US fighters in service. And toward the end of that conflict, the airmen again found themselves at a considerable disadvantage when they had to battle the more advanced jet-powered Me 262. Five years later in Korea, American airmen yet again engaged a superior flying machine, the Soviet MiG-15. What was the situation in the Vietnam War?

There are those who consider the Vietnam War as proof that technology has been overused or misused. Others view technology as the Sirens of Greek legend, luring America into the Southeast Asian war and onto the rocks of defeat. Critics write of blind technological fanaticism, hubris, and overconfidence as the United States attempted to fight a remote, antiseptic war. Leaving the rhetoric aside, how well did Air Force technology perform during the war?

Vietnam was not what the Air Force envisioned as its next conflict. Thinking in terms of a massive nuclear exchange, the airmen planned, equipped, and trained for nuclear war. In fairness, this was the direction from above, and it did give the United States a formidable offensive force and effective deterrent (Strategic Air Command) against Communist aggression. However, this emphasis not only put the other services at a disadvantage, it also crippled other Air Force missions. Consequently, the Air Force story in Vietnam is how an air force designed for one kind of war performed in a drastically different one.

*This article is part of a longer study of Air Force technology from Vietnam through the Gulf War. A shorter version of the article was delivered at the annual meeting of the Society of Military History on 11 April 1997.

Clearly the US Air Force had problems in the Vietnam War, and some were with technology. This paper focuses on three examples of Air Force technology in the Vietnam War. These vary in type, demonstrates both success and failure, and thus are representative. They are the F-105, fixed-wing gunships, and precision-guided munitions (PGM).1

The F-105
The Republic F-105 Thunderchief in many ways symbolizes Air Force performance in Vietnam. It was an aircraft that looked good from any angle. It was fast and stable, a machine that pilots called "honest." It could carry a heavy bomb load a long distance at a high speed. In short, it was a fine aircraft, a pilot's plane, well designed for the single purpose of fighting a nuclear war.2

Just as the Korean War erupted in June 1950, the Air Force asked Republic Aviation to conceive a successor to its F-84F. What emerged was an aircraft designed around a bomb bay that could accommodate a nuclear weapon and extensive avionics to lighten the workload of the pilot flying at high speed and at low altitudes. This would allow Tactical Air Command to participate in nuclear warfare, which was the primary emphasis of the American military during this period. The F-105 could carry eight thousand pounds internally and another four thousand pounds externally and turned out to be the largest and heaviest single-seat American fighter up to that time. It replaced the F-100D as Tactical Air Command's principal aircraft. (It had twice the bomb load and 50 percent more speed than the F-100 Super Sabre.) It also mounted a rapid-firing 20 mm Gatling gun. To be very clear, however, the F-105 was primarily designed as a bomber, and its air-to-air fighter capability was secondary.

During its first flight on 22 October 1955, it exceeded the speed of sound. When the aircraft was modified into the B version, it featured such innovations as a “coke bottle” fuselage, “clover leaf” speed brakes on the aircraft’s tail, and the all-flying tail.3 The first squadron was equipped with the Thunderchief in 1959.4

Although designated as a fighter (F-105), its size and weight, not to mention its bomb bay, brought this designation into dispute. Early on it was saddled with such uncomplimentary nicknames as “Lead Sled,” “Ultra Hog,” and “Thud.” Some write that it earned a poor reputation mainly due to the poor reliability of the avionics and the pilot’s unfamiliarity with the fighter. The aircraft’s low in-commission rate and high cost of maintenance were both disturbing and frustrating. The aircraft and its systems were complex and new to the Air Force, and spare parts were short. More dramatic and more important to its reputation were crashes. An examination of the records of other fighters of the century series, however, indicates that at least early in its career (up to 53,000 flying hours), the Thunderchief’s accident record was only bested by the F-106.5 Regardless, it was the Air Force’s primary strike aircraft during the decade of the 1960s and what the Air Force had when the Vietnam War began. It flew three-quarters of the Air Force’s strike missions during Rolling Thunder, the American strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam between 1965 and 1968.6

The F-105 did not fare well in combat. The Thunderchief served as a fighter-bomber but was limited by its avionics designed for nuclear, not conventional, missions. Ironically, the bomb bay was used to carry a fuel tank, not bombs. At low level it was the fastest aircraft of the war, but was at a disadvantage in air-to-air combat because of its lack of maneuverability.7 More than half (397) of the 753 F-105Ds and Fs built were lost in the war. Overall, the F-105 had the highest loss rate of any US aircraft operating in Southeast Asia and over North Vietnam.8 Why such heavy losses? The political restrictions certainly played a role, allowing the North Vietnamese to build up and adjust their defenses. Another factor was that the tactics that had been developed for a short nuclear war proved costly and inappropriate in a long conventional air campaign fought against extensive ground-based air defenses. The introduction of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) made matters even worse for the airmen. A third factor was the aircraft itself.

The F-105 was neither as rugged nor as survivable as its World War II predecessor, the P-47, which was rightly celebrated for its toughness. The Thunderchief was designed to fight a nuclear war in which the delivery of one nuclear weapon at low altitude and high speed was all that was required. Little thought was given to a campaign consisting of hundreds of missions extending over years. Therefore, survivability was not a major design consideration; ruggedness, redundant systems, armor, and the like were not priority items. In fact, some survivability factors were traded off to enhance other performance. Two such instances proved critical. First, the fighter’s two sets of hydraulic lines were run close together, apparently to ease manufacture and maintenance, so that a hit on one could easily take out the other. A loss of hydraulic pressure caused the stabilizer to lock in the full “up” position, pushing the nose down. Second, the internal and bomb-bay fuel tanks were not self-sealing. Such was the combat norm since 1940, for good reason, as one 1950 study found that 80 percent of American, British, and German aircraft losses in World War II were directly caused by fire, most from damaged fuel systems. At the very least, even a small caliber hit could cause a leak. This helps explain why the F-105 was so vulnerable to fire and explosion, three times as likely as the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom to be lost to fire or explosion.9

As early as December 1965, the F-105 was being unfavorably compared with the F-4, as it was believed that it was 1.5 to 2.5 times as vulnerable as the Phantom. One study indicated that when hit by hostile fire, the F-105 had a 15 percent higher rate of loss than the F-4. This led to a recommendation that the Thunderchief be shifted from action over North Vietnam to the less lethal skies of South Vietnam, and it spurred a number of studies to assess the vulnerability of the aircraft and search for remedies. One conclusion was that if the F-4 and F-105 were fairly compared (using similar time periods, similar missions, and similar risks), their loss rates were about the same.10

The Thunderchief was modified to deal with some of these problems. By mid-1965, the flight control system had been changed so that if the hydraulic system was hit, the pilot could mechanically lock the horizontal stabilizer at an optimum setting. He could then use an electric toggle switch to control roll and pitch with the wing flaps along with differential engine power to fly the plane. This could at least get a pilot out of the immediate area before he was forced to eject from the stricken aircraft. A rocket ejection seat was fitted into the aircraft to enhance pilot survivability. Self-sealing tanks and bomb-bay fire extinguisher modifications were also added.11

It is hard to put a positive spin on the F-105’s service in Vietnam. One might say diplomatically that its record could be called “mixed,” but that really doesn’t say anything. To cut to the heart of the issue, the F-105 could not overcome the limitations of its basic design, the peculiar conditions of the war, the role in which it found itself, or American tactics. At best, it proved to be a mediocre performer in difficult conditions. Similar to the military, it served honorably and capably in a losing cause. What more could be expected? The last F-105D unit returned to the US in late 1970, to be replaced by the F-4 in the fighter-bomber role.

Gunships
In contrast to the F-105, the fixed-wing gunship was a great developmental and operational success. A few dedicated, innovative individuals brought forth a new concept quickly and cheaply that fit the war that was being fought in Vietnam. The basic gunship concept is quite simple: an aircraft flying in a level turn around a point on the ground (as if tethered to a pylon, hence called a “pylon turn”) can deliver fairly accurate firepower from guns firing perpendicular to the line of flight.12 This concept was first proposed in 1926 and demonstrated the next year. A number of other airmen later advanced the idea, but the Army Air Forces/US Air Force did not pick up on it until the early 1960s.

The idea reached Capt John Simmons at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, through an indirect route.13 After overcoming numerous rebuffs, he pushed through a modest test program in mid-1963 that demonstrated that a pilot could track a target while in a pylon turn. The breakthrough came in August 1964 when a C-131 armed with a 7.62 mm Gatling gun achieved better than expected accuracy in firing tests over the Gulf of Mexico. The next month, three Gatling guns were mounted aboard a C-47 and also successfully tested. Capt Ronald Terry forcefully articulated a concept of C-47s delivering accurate and massive firepower to hamlets under attack. Things moved ahead rather rapidly, for on 2 November 1964 Terry helped brief the concept to the Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay, who ordered that the C-47 be tested in Vietnam.


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In contrast to the F-105, the fixed-wing gunship was a great developmental and operational success.


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There was opposition to the concept. Gen Walter Sweeney, commander of Tactical Air Command, had two seemingly contrary objections: could the aircraft survive, and if so, would it undermine the Air Force’s position in the battle with the Army over armed helicopters? In addition, he did not see how the gunship would work in other conflicts, specifically one in Europe. Therefore, success in Vietnam might saddle the command with a number of aircraft that would prove useless and vulnerable where it really counted, in Europe. Certainly, the idea of using obsolete transports to support besieged hamlets at night, at low speeds, and from low altitudes did not appeal to the airmen, who thought primarily in terms of newer aircraft flying ever higher and faster. Nevertheless, the tests went forward.

Terry and his team arrived in South Vietnam in December 1964. The gunship quickly demonstrated that it not only worked but was valuable. On its first night mission on 23–24 December, it helped repel a Vietcong attack on an outpost.14 The gunship concept would be used in two very different roles. The first was to provide heavy firepower to ground forces engaged in combat in South Vietnam. The other was to interdict enemy logistics in Laos. The aircraft’s success continued, but better gunships were coming on-line. On 1 December 1969, US Air Force AC-47s flew their last mission.15


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Gen Creighton Abrams told the Seventh Air Force commander, Gen John Vogt, that the three weapons that had been unqualified successes were the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command (TOW) missile; the AC-130; and the guided bomb.


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In November 1966, the C-130 was picked as a follow-on aircraft. The four-engined turboprop had much greater flying performance than the ancient “Gooney Bird” and carried much heavier firepower, four 7.62 mm and four 20 mm Gatling guns compared to the AC-47’s three 7.62 mm guns. Nicknamed “Spectre,” it also mounted an array of advanced sensors.16

In September 1967, Captain Terry returned to Vietnam to test the AC-130. The evaluations concluded that the AC-130 was “a three-fold improvement over its predecessor, the AC-47.”17 The AC-130 was deemed the most cost-effective, close-support, and interdiction weapon in the USAF inventory.

Four AC-130s were sent into combat in Laos before the end of 1968 and proved to be some of the best weapons in the interdiction campaign. During the period January 1968 through April 1969, they flew less than 4 percent of the total sorties against moving targets, yet claimed over 29 percent of the destroyed and damaged trucks. Little wonder why the Air Force wanted more.

Concern about the gunship’s vulnerability pushed the Air Force towards heavier armament to increase stand-off range. (Larger guns would also do more damage to targets.) In mid-1969, a group that included Major Terry suggested that two 40 mm18 and two 20 mm guns become the standard armament. They also recommended better sensors (such as low-light-level television and improved infrared), a digital computer to replace the analog one, and a laser designator. A program dubbed “Surprise Package” that incorporated these ideas, got the go-ahead in September 1969. After a month of stateside test flights, the aircraft arrived in Thailand on 5 December for combat tests lasting through 18 January. The evaluators judged the improved model twice as effective as the existing C-130s.19

The last effort during the war to boost the AC-130’s killing power was to mount a 105 mm howitzer.20 While to the outsider this appears to be quite a feat, it actually was accomplished very smoothly. The gun saw combat during the 1971–72 dry season campaign and in Linebacker I, where it proved to be very effective, accounting for 55 percent of the tanks destroyed or damaged.

The third airframe used as a gunship was the C-119, another obsolete transport like the C-47, however not as esteemed. Nevertheless, it reinforced the gunship effort in late 1968 and became the most numerous of the Vietnam War gunships. The AC-119G was intended to take up the AC-47’s mission in South Vietnam: defend hamlets, provide fire support for ground troops, and fly close air support and escort convoys.21 While it served well, it was really little improvement over the AC-47.

The Air Force thought better of the AC-119K. The K model had increased engine power (two jet engines supplemented the two props), heavier armament (two 20 mm guns in addition to the G’s four 7.62 mm guns), an improved fire control system, and forward looking infrared radar (FLIR). Both AC-119 models did good work and suffered few losses. The AC-119Gs proved worthy successors of the AC-47 for operations in South Vietnam, while the AC-119Ks were able to complement the AC-130s in the interdiction campaign in Laos. In the overall scheme, the AC-119s were a midrange model between the “Model T” AC-47 and the “Cadillac” AC-130E.

The last challenge to the USAF in the Vietnam War came in 1972. By then the Communists had improved the Ho Chi Minh Trail into an extensive road net and greatly upgraded its defenses. The North Vietnamese upped the ante by deploying SAMs, both the large SA-2s and shoulder-fired SA-7s. Damage to the gunships increased while truck kills declined. Even escorting fighters could not provide the gunships with the permissive air environment they required. The increased attrition, as well as the 1972 North Vietnamese invasion, forced the Air Force to shift its emphasis.

The main mission of American airpower in 1972 was to thwart the North Vietnamese invasion. Certainly, the gunships played an important role in that successful endeavor. The top American officer in the theater, Gen Creighton Abrams, told the Seventh Air Force commander, Gen John Vogt, that the three weapons that had been unqualified successes were the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command (TOW) missile; the AC-130; and the guided bomb.22

Precision-Guided Munitions
PGMs were another success story. American airmen entered the Vietnam conflict armed primarily with free-fall bombs (“dumb bombs”) that were no different from those used in World War I. Despite experiments with guided bombs in World War II and Korea, the Air Force had only two Navy air-to-ground missiles in 1965. The Bullpup, a rocket-powered, radio-control guided, 250-pound bomb, was used from the outset of Rolling Thunder. Its small warhead, however, was totally inadequate against North Vietnamese bridges.23 The Navy’s Walleye proved better. (It was an unpowered, 829-pound bomb guided by an automatic tracking television guidance, giving it a “launch and leave” capability.) The Air Force began Walleye combat tests in August 1967 that achieved excellent results in good visibility against targets that gave a strong contrast and were lightly defended.24 Later Walleye operations in more demanding conditions were less successful. It continued to be used, but due to its operating restrictions, cost, and the appearance of laser-guided bombs (LGB), comprised only a small fraction (6 percent) of the total number of PGMs employed in Vietnam.25 The guided bomb of choice turned out to be based on a new technology: lasers.

The use of lasers in guidance applications was first discussed in 1958 and was later nourished by the Army as antitank seekers. But the Vietnam War skewed the Army in other directions as it recognized that Vietnam was not going to be a tank war. So the promising effort was passed on to the Air Force.26 Laser-guided bombs were far enough along by mid-1967 to begin combat tests, during which the 750-pound bombs achieved an average error of 64 feet, and the two-thousand-pound bombs 32 feet. Over half were scored direct hits.27 The tests continued. In 1969, 61 percent of 1,601 Mk 84 laser bombs released scored direct hits; the 85 percent that were guided had an average error of 9.6 feet. As this was less than the bomb’s lethal radius, bombing results were impressive.28

Nevertheless, the laser-guided bombs had their limitations. Smoke, haze, and clouds could nullify the weapon. One aircraft had to loiter in a predictable (and thus vulnerable) flight pattern (a circle) while the bomb fell to earth. There were some problems of reliability: in the initial tests, nine of the total 66 bombs suffered malfunctions. The seeker heads proved vulnerable to damage if flown through a rainstorm. Because of the system’s undulating flight path, the bomb lost energy and had less stand-off range than did the Walleye.29

The Air Force pushed the laser-guided bombs. The laser kit could be fairly easily adapted to other bombs, and it was. By 1971, the Air Force was using five-hundred-, one- thousand-, two-thousand-, and three-thousand-pound bombs. But the smallest of these became the standard, not because of cost (it was only marginally cheaper), but because more of the lighter bombs could be carried on each sortie. Better accuracy permitted smaller payloads to be more effective.30

Meanwhile the Air Force was seeking to improve the weapon. Pave Knife was the code name for a system that consisted of a laser designating pod carried beneath the strike aircraft, making it both bomber and designator. Fewer aircraft could now do the same job, and were less vulnerable.31

This was the situation when the Communist Easter offensive of 1972 exploded. PGMs proved to be excellent weapons in two diverse roles in the 1972 campaign: precise bombing of the North Vietnam homeland and the repulse of the North Vietnamese army in the field.

Guided weapons were important in the attacks on North Vietnam for two major reasons. First, laser weapons allowed fewer aircraft to do greater damage, not only putting fewer men and machines at risk, but getting the job done the first time. In view of the effective North Vietnamese defenses, this was critical. Second, they achieved accuracies that permitted employment in close proximity to civilians, dikes, and the like. Two examples made this dramatically clear.

North Vietnamese bridges were prime targets in the effort to cut off supplies from the fighting in the South. Symbolic of this long, frustrating, and deadly duel between American airmen and North Vietnamese defenders throughout the war was the Thanh Hoa (“The Dragon’s Jaw”) Bridge.32 Prior to Linebacker I, it had withstood 871 Air Force and Navy sorties and cost 11 aircraft.33 On 13 May 1972, 14 bombers dropped both laser-guided and dumb bombs that scored several hits, knocking one of the main spans off its abutment and closing the bridge to rail traffic for the rest of the campaign.34

Another example of the confidence that the laser weapons gave the American airmen was the attack on the power-generating plant at Lang Chi Reservoir. Its proximity to a major dam put this key target off limits to the airmen with conventional bombs. In June 1972, the Air Force used LGBs to knock out the generating facility without causing any damage to the dam.35 The guided bombs also proved valuable in fighting the conventional war in the South. Airpower was really the only weapon that could blunt two new and major Communist equipment advantages in the assault—tanks and 130 mm artillery. Airpower was about all that could get at these guns that outranged anything in the South Vietnamese army. Laser-guided bombs were also very effective tank killers: while the LGBs were involved in only 10 percent of the antitank effort, they were credited with 22 percent of the tank kills. Laser bombs also could take out bridges and thus seriously impede the advancing tanks.36

The advantage of the guided bombs is starkly revealed when compared with the F-105’ s work in the same areas (Route Packages VIA and VIB). The F-105s achieved a circular error probable (CEP) of 447 feet and 5.5 percent direct hits during the end of Rolling Thunder, compared with guided bombs’ CEP of 23 feet and 48 percent direct hits during the period of February 1972 through February 1973.37 One study found that LGBs were one to two hundred times as effective as conventional bombs against very hard targets and 20 to 40 times against soft and area targets.38 General Vogt stated that laser weapons were about a hundred times as effective as dumb bombs.39

What is the explanation for the success of the guided bombs? As with gunships, a few innovative, motivated individuals pushed a promising idea forward. In a similar fashion, the key seems to be the simple and cheap technology. Because it was cheap, the program at first was low profile, allowing exceptional freedom of action. The low cost also permitted a competition to be held that not only demonstrated the overall concept of laser guidance, but also indicated that the technology that seemed the riskier of the two, was worth pursuing. Low cost also meant that testing could be repeated, allowing the device to be modified and fine-tuned before entering combat, in contrast to the F-111 (a story that is beyond the scope of this article). Its simplicity not only kept costs down, but made it a reliable and workable weapon. There was good cooperation between the manufacturer (Texas Instruments) and the customer (Eglin AFB, Florida). Design specifications were relatively loose, and military standards were not applied until late in the process. One student of the weapon concluded that flexibility was one of the key factors of success.40

Observations
What observations can be drawn from this brief look at US Air Force technology in the Vietnam War? First, the airmen can get off the hook, a little at least, for their inadequate technology early in the conflict in that they designed their weapons for the war their civilian superiors demanded: nuclear war. While it is true that the military does not pick the wars it fights, it does pick the technologies it uses. The problem is the interface between the war and the technology. Second, airpower is more than flying. Contrary to what laypeople, most buffs, and some academics (and I fear perhaps some airmen) believe, airpower is more than airframes. Not only is it dependent on nontechnological factors (strategy, tactics, and training), but also on associated equipment such as munitions. The failure of the F-105 and the successes of the obsolete C-47s and C-119s as weapons platforms and the great increase in effectiveness from the use of laser-guided bombs underscore this point. A third observation is that Vietnam demonstrates the problems of an asymmetric war. This was not a total war for the United States; this was not the worst-case scenario of fighting an equivalent power with equivalent technology and probably greater numbers. Fourth, the military chooses to forget the lessons of Korea (for example, the difficulties of fighting a nonindustrial country, the problems of night interdiction, and the restrictions of a limited war), while the politicians were dominated by that war and the fear of Chinese intervention. The Air Force was not trying to fight the last war, as the military is so often accused of doing. It was trying to fight the next war. It was the civilians who were refighting Korea. Finally, simple is better. The highly sophisticated, complex, and expensive F-105 did not do well. In contrast, the simple, reliable, maintainable, and cheap AC-47 proved very effective. In a similar manner, the relatively low-cost laser-guided bombs permitted changes and testing that led to both tactical and manufacturing success.


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Vietnam demonstrates the problems of an asymmetric war. This was not a total war for the United States; this was not the worst-case scenario of fighting an equivalent power with equivalent technology and probably greater numbers.


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In brief, then, the Air Force came into the Vietnam War woefully unprepared for the war it had to fight. While it is true that air operations were constrained by civilian-imposed restrictions, the Air Force had also limited its abilities by its concentration on nuclear war. It rose to the challenge of the war in Vietnam but paid a high price. The Air Force that conducted successful operations in the 1972 Linebacker I and II campaigns was different than the one that met defeat earlier in Rolling Thunder. But the war had also changed from a guerrilla war to a conventional one.

Technology is important, but it is only one factor in fielding a capable and winning air force. What failed in Vietnam was not the technology, but a broad understanding of the power and limits of both airpower and air technology. One of the major characteristics of both is flexibility. It is this general lesson that should be carried forward into planning for Air Force operations in the next century.

Notes

1. Other possible choices include aircraft such as the F-4 and F-111; sensor technology (Igloo White); modifications to the B-52 (“Big Belly” and Skyspot); drones (Buffalo Hunter); anti-SAM (Iron Hand, antiradiation missiles, radar homing and warning [RHAW]); and the list goes on.

2. Marcelle Knaack, Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems, vol. 1, Post–World War II Fighters, 1945–1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1978), 204; Jerry Hoblit, “AF-105 Thunderchief,” 87, 89 in Robin Higham and Abigail Siddall, eds., Flying Combat Aircraft of the USAAF-USAF (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 1975), 87, 89; and USAF Oral History Program, interview with Robinson Risner, 12 March 1983, Historical Research Agency (HRA), K239.0512-1370.

3. J. C. Scutts, F-105 Thunderchief (New York: Scribner’s, 1981), 113; USAF Oral History Program, interview with Gen James Ferguson, 8–9 May 1973, 40–41, HRA K239.0512-672; Enzo Angelucci and Peter Bowers, The American Fighter (New York: Orion, 1987), 355, 407–8; Robert Archer, The Republic F-105 (Fallbrock, Calif.: Aero, 1969), 9; Ray Wagner, American Combat Planes (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), 472; and Theodore van Geffen Jr. and Gerald C. Arruda, “Thunderchief,” Air University Review 34, no. 2 (January–February 1983): 48.

4. Angelucci and Bowers, 408; Knaack, 195–96; and Wagner, 472.

5. In 1964, 38 F-105s were lost to explosions or fires, 12 in the first four months. The most costly in terms of reputation was a fatal accident in May 1964 by the Air Force’s highly prestigious and visible stunt team, the Thunderbirds. This was the F-105’s sixth and last performance in the stunning Thunderbird colors. The team went back to flying F-100s for that season and never again flew the F-105s. There were at least six groundings of the aircraft. Van Geffen and Arruda, 54, 56; Scutts, 22–23; Knaack, 194–95; David Anderton, Republic F-105 Thunderchief (London: Osprey, 1983), 13; and Donald Sorlie, “An Analysis of the F-105 Weapons System in Out-Country Counter Air Operations,” Air War College case study, (Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air University, April 1968), 27; and Archer, 57.

6. Delbert Corum, “The Tale of Two Bridges,” in Air War-Vietnam (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978), 12.

7. It had been built for speed at low altitude, and its large size, heavy weight, and relatively small wing did not permit fighter-like maneuverability. Of 332 F-105 combat losses, 22 were credited to MiGs in air-to-air combat. In exchange, the F-105s claimed 27.5 MiGs. Tactical Air Command, “Summary of USAF Aircraft Losses in SEA,” June 1974, 25, HRA K417.0423-16; and R. Frank Futrell et al., Aces and Aerial Victories: The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1965–1973 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, 1976), 117–25, 157.

8. To be precise, over North Vietnam the F-100 and the USAF-manned A-l had higher loss rates, but together they flew less than 6 percent of the sorties flown by the F-105 over the North. Michael McCrea, US Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses and Damage in Southeast Asia (1962–1973) (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis, August 1976), 1-4 through 1-6; and “Summary of USAF Aircraft Losses in SEA,” 22, 38.

9. John Guilmartin, “Editorial Note,” Air University Review 34, no. 2 (January–February 1983): 53. Deleting the self-sealing feature saved six hundred pounds. A 1967 Wright-Patterson study stated that fires were reported in 50 percent of the F-105 losses. Patrick G. Long, “Evaluation of F-105 Weapon System in the Role of Out-Country Interdiction [in] Southeast Asia, 1965–1967,” Research Report no. 3633 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1968), 61–62. Another study that year indicated that fires and explosions were suspected as the major cause of loss in 45 percent of 42 F-105 losses, and in 16 percent of 44 F-4 losses. Max Cleveland et al., “Vulnerabilities of the F-4C and the F-105 Aircraft to Ground Fire in SEA,” August 1967, 10, 20, 22, HRA K740.01-25; and Warren Greene, “The Development of the B-52 Aircraft, 1945-53,”11 May 1956, 44–45, HRA K243.042-1.

10. Robert Hiller and Philip Conley, “A Comparison of the Vulnerabilities of the F-105 and F-4 Aircraft to Ground Fire,” December 1965, HRA K717.3101-11; and Cleveland, 114.

11. The previous ejection seat required a one hundred-foot altitude and 120-knot minimum airspeed to operate successfully; the rocket seat could successfully operate at zero altitude and an 85-knot minimum airspeed. Scutts, 68, 85; and Sorlie, 27–28.

12. The essential source on this topic is the well-detailed and documented study by Jack Ballard, The Development and Employment of Fixed-Wing Gunships, 1962–1972 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1982). Unless otherwise noted, this section is drawn from Ballard. A briefer account that summarizes Ballard focuses on the AC-47 and adds a few tidbits is Lawrence Greenberg’s undocumented “Spooky: Dragon in the Sky,” Vietnam, 1 April 1980.

13. Gilmour MacDonald proposed variants of it three times during his AAF/USAF career, in 1942, 1945, and 1961. MacDonald passed the idea along to Ralph Flexman of Bell Aerosystems in late 1961, who carried the idea forward. Flexman, an Air Force reservist with a mobilization assignment at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, suggested the concept to Simmons.

14. The tracers from the aircraft’s three miniguns carved a fiery arc through the air, and along with the guns’ distinctive roar, earned it the nickname “Puff” and “Dragonship” after the popular Peter, Paul, and Mary song of the day, “Puff the Magic Dragon.” Later the AC-47 gunship would be given the radio call sign and the name for which it would be remembered: “Spooky.”

15. The aircraft were turned over to the Laotian and South Vietnamese air forces. In their combat service in Vietnam, the AC-47s fired 97 million rounds and were credited with successfully defending almost four thousand hamlets, outposts, and forts and killing fifty-three hundred enemy troops. In all, 53 C-47s had been converted into the gunship version. Seventeen were listed as combat losses and two as operational losses. “Summary of USAF Losses in SEA,” 22. In World War II, the AAF fired 197 million rounds in the European theater and 91 million rounds in the Mediterranean theater. “Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II,” prepared by the Office of Statistical Control, US Army Statistical Control Division, 1945, 245.

16. These included the Starlight Scope (called night observation device [NOD]), side and forward looking radar, and forward looking infrared radar (FLIR). Kenneth Werrell, “Did USAF Technology Fail in Vietnam?” (paper presented to the Society of Military History, Montgomery, Ala., 26 April 1997), 22.

17. Ballard, 89.

18. One improvement was to develop a more potent 40 mm projectile. A standard round was fitted with a misch-metal liner, a metal resembling cigarette-lighter flint. Combat tests in January 1971 indicated that it set off four to five times as many fires and explosions as did the standard round.

19. A later Seventh Air Force report on Commando Hunt III (1969–1970) credited the Surprise Package AC-130 with 7.34 trucks destroyed or damaged per sortie compared with 4.34 for the other C-130s, 3.12 for the AC-123, and 2.27 for the AC-119. A sensor that detected truck-engine ignition emissions (Black Crow) and a processor to integrate its signals along with infrared and low-light television were added to the AC-130.

20. The 105 mm projectile carried 5.6 pounds of high explosive compared with the 0.6 pounds carried by the 40 mm projectile.

21. In May 1968, the Air Force called personnel from an Indiana-based C-119 Reserve unit to active duty to crew the gunship. This was one of the few Reserve units to serve in the war.

22. Ballard, 243.

23. The best on this subject is David Mets, “The Quest for a Surgical Strike: The Air Force and Laser Guided Bombs” (Eglin AFB, Fla.: Air Force Systems Command, October 1987). Unless otherwise noted, all material in this section is from this source.

24. Through 8 November, the Air Force dropped 22 Walleyes and scored 13 direct hits and two near hits.

25. During the course of the war, the Air Force expended 206 Walleyes and 545 of its later version, the homing bomb (HOBO) system. Donald Blackwelder, “The Long Road to Desert Storm and Beyond: The Development of Precision-Guided Bombs” (thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 1993), 18. About 69 percent of the 774 Walleyes dropped by the Navy scored direct hits. The electro-optical guided bomb (EOGB) was more costly than the LGB ($17,000 versus $4,700). Other disadvantages of the TV-guided sensor was that it was restricted to daytime use and required modification of the aircraft. “Linebacker: Overview of the First 120 Days,” Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations (CHECO) report, Headquarters PACAF, September 1973, 21; Patrick Breitling, “Guided Bomb Operations in SEA: The Weather Dimension, 1 February–31 December 1972,” CHECO report, 1 October 1973, 27; Blackwelder, 18; A. Starr et al., ”Evaluation of Guided Bomb Systems Employed in Southeast Asia,” Institute for Defense Analysis, May 1974, 7, 27; Mets; and Melvin Porter, “Second Generation Weaponry in SEA,” September 1970, 3–4, 8–12, 15–6 HRA K717.0413-80.

26. It also specified an error of no more than 25 feet, a guidance reliability of at least 80 percent, and the capability of delivery from either dive or level-aircraft attitudes. Texas Instruments (TI) had already begun tests at Eglin that revealed a number of significant problems that were corrected. One major change was to add a canard configuration. This put the complete guidance package in the nose, which made it simpler to build and handle, and enhanced reliability and made it adaptable to a large number of Air Force bombs. Another change was to spin (or rotate) the bomb at a specific rate to smooth out the undulations of TI’s “bang-bang” controls. This also helped cancel out electronic and aerodynamic errors. Peter DeLeon, The Laser-Guided Bomb, RAND Report 1312-1 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, June 1974), 1–27; and Mets. An F-4 flew a pylon turn to keep the target in the laser beam while the bomb was falling. A second aircraft dropped the bomb from a dive into a “cone” or “basket” that at 10,000 to 12,000 feet measured about a mile across. Once it released the bomb, the strike aircraft could depart, but the designator had to remain and “laze the target until the bomb impacted about thirty seconds after bomb release.” “Second Generation Weaponry,” 20; and Mets.

27. The difference in accuracy between the two bombs was attributed to the tail fins. Because of its inferior accuracy and lesser cratering capability (35 feet wide and seven feet deep versus 49 feet wide and 13 feet deep), the testers recommended that the M-117 be discontinued. “Second Generation Weaponry,” 21–23; and Mets.

28. “Second Generation Weaponry,” 30–35.

29. A 1968 study indicated aircraft dropping PGMs took two to three times the number of flak hits as those dropping dumb bombs. James G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 10; Charles T. Fox, “Precision-Guided Munitions: Past, Present, and Future,” defense analytical study, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 14 April 1995; “Second Generation Weaponry,” 22–23; and Mets.

30. Other aircraft in addition to the F-4s became laser designators, including the AC-130 Pave Spectre gunships, Pave Nail OV-10 forward air controllers, and Tropic Moon III, B-57G long-range, interdiction aircraft. Porter, 44–45; Starr et al., 5; and Mets.

31. Mets.

32. Located 75 miles south of Hanoi, the 540-foot-long bridge had only been opened to traffic in 1964. It was listed as target number 14 (of 94) on the airmen’s 1965 target list.

33. The Air Force also tried another type of munition to destroy the bridge. On the last two days of May 1966, it attempted to float a number of five-thousand-pound mass-focus bombs down the Song Ma River to take it out. The bridge survived; one C-130 and one P-4 did not. Corum, 52–55, 59; and Sam McGowan, “Bridge at Dragon’s Jaw,” Vietnam, Summer 1989, 34, 36.

34. Walter Lynch, “An Analysis of Guided Bomb Systems Employment Effectiveness against Bridges during Linebacker I,” August 1975, ii–iv, 5, 17, 29; Mets; Melvin F. Porter, “Linebacker: Overview of the First 120 Days,” 24; and Corum, 84–85.

35. Mets.

36. Blackwelder, 16–17; and Mets. EOGBs were primarily employed in low-threat areas. During 1972, 329 were launched, and 53.5 percent achieved hits. In comparison, 9,094 LGBs were dropped, and 47.5 percent achieved direct hits. I assume that the EOGB “hits” are the same as the “direct hits” of the LGBs. Breitling, 20, 23–25, 28.

37. “Circular error probable” is the radius within which half of the bombs will fall. It should be noted that when these bombs were guided, they either scored direct or very close to direct hits. They were either “a go” or “no go.” During this period, 15.2 percent of the guided bombs did not guide. Blackwelder, 16.

38. R. L. Blachly, P. A. Conine, and B. H. Sharkey, Laser and Electro-Optical Guided Bomb Performance in Southeast Asia (Linebacker I): A Briefing, RAND Report 1326-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, October 1973), 3.

39. Vogt interview, 12 November 1972, in “Linebacker: Overview of the First 120 Days,” 59. Analysts calculated that during Linebacker II, LGBs were about 15 times as effective as visual-aimed conventional bombs. This may understate their capability as 32 of the 56 LGB sorties were aimed at radio communications facilities, the most difficult target set the airmen engaged during that operation. Also note that during the 11-day campaign, there were only eight hours of daylight with weather suitable for PGM operations. Herman Gilster and Robert Frady, “Linebacker II, USAF Bombing Survey,” April 1973, 10, 22, 40–43, HRA K717.64-8.

40. DeLeon, 27, 32, 34–35, 40.


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The best executive is the one who has sense enough to pick
good men to do what he wants done, and self-restraint
enough to keep from meddling with them while they do it.
—Theodore Roosevelt


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Contributor

Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell (USAFA; MA, PhD, Duke University) is a retired professor of history at Radford University, Virginia. Previous assignments include visiting associate professor at the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and visiting fellow at the Airpower Research Institute at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Dr. Werrell is the author of The Evolution of the Cruise Missile, Eighth Air Force Bibliography, and Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


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103
Chapter Five
REVIVAL OF THE AIR-SUPERIORITY FIGHTER
INTRODUCTION
The late 1960s and 1970s witnessed the development of two new Air Force
fighters—the F-15 and F-16—and two new Navy fighters—the F-14 and
F/A-18—that would become the mainstays of America’s tactical fighter forces
for the remainder of the century. In particular, the two Air Force fighters and
the F/A-18 represent a substantial change from many of the trends evident in
previous fighter modernization decisions. The F-15 was the first Air Force
fighter since the development of the North American F-86 in the late 1940s that
was optimized for maneuverability and agility for dogfights with enemy fighters.
In an even more dramatic departure from recent experience, the F-16 and
F/A-18 programs attempted to reverse the trends toward heavier, more complex
and costly fighters.
These changes did not come easily. They resulted from a long, arduous, and
turbulent process during which various schools of thought on fighter doctrine
and design vied for influence. Nonetheless, these often vitriolic debates ended
in the design and development of several of the world’s most capable fighters.
OF EAGLES AND TOMCATS
As early as 1964, a consensus began to emerge within the Air Force that a new
tactical fighter was needed. This consensus in part reflected Air Force dissatisfaction
with the TFX program and McNamara’s policy of fighter commonality
among the services. Under McNamara’s guidance, the Air Force took the
unprecedented step of procuring two Navy-developed combat aircraft, the F-4
and the A-7, and agreed to develop the F-105 replacement as the joint TFX program
with the Navy. As serious developmental problems emerged on the TFX
program that indicated that the F-111 would not be able to meet all of its multirole,
multiservice performance requirements, various influential elements
104 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
within the Air Force increasingly voiced the desire for a tactical fighter developed
by and for the Air Force.1
During the first half of 1965, Air Force officials continued to debate some of the
fundamental issues that still caused concern on the TFX program, such as
multirole ground-attack capability versus air-superiority optimization, and Air
Force–Navy commonality. However, the escalation of the air war over Vietnam
soon convinced many officials in the Air Force and the Pentagon that a new,
specialized air-defense fighter was needed, as antiquated North Vietnamese
MiG-17s began registering victories over much larger, more complex and
expensive, but less maneuverable U.S. fighters. On April 4, 1965, several North
Vietnamese Korean War vintage MiG-17s equipped only with guns shot down
two sophisticated F-105s on a bombing run against the Than Hoa Bridge. This
incident shocked the U.S. tactical fighter community and galvanized sentiment
in the Air Force for a new air-superiority fighter. Shortly thereafter, General
McConnell, Air Force Chief of Staff, issued a formal document emphasizing the
importance of the air-superiority mission. This document served as the basis
for a requirement statement for a new fighter.2
In November 1965, OSD directed the Air Force to procure a version of the
Vought A-7 as its new dedicated attack aircraft. While disappointing to those
who advocated procurement of a higher-performance supersonic fighter-attack
aircraft, such as the Northrop F-5A, for the ground support mission, this decision
nonetheless cleared the way for the later acquisition of a specialized airsuperiority
fighter. In December 1965, the DoD launched a Concept Formulation
Phase for a new fighter, dubbed the F-X, by sending out RFPs soliciting
parametric design studies to 13 contractors. Eight companies responded, and
in March 1966, the DoD awarded study contracts to North American, Lockheed,
and Boeing. Grumman also participated using its own funds.3
However, important elements within OSD and the Air Force remained opposed
to a specialized air-defense fighter, preventing consensus from forming around
any one of the design approaches the participating contractors had advanced.
Many OSD officials still favored a joint Air Force–Navy multirole fighter
(referred to as the F-X–Navy Fighter Attack Aircraft Experimental [VFAX]
requirement) with significant ground-attack capabilities. In addition, the USAF
Aeronautical Systems Division proposed a very large multirole fighter with a
variable-geometry wing with a maximum takeoff gross weight of 60,000 lbs. As
the F-X design evolved toward an aircraft similar to the increasingly controversial
F-111 and as projected R&D costs skyrocketed, opposition within the Air
______________
1Gentry (1976), pp. 9–10.
2Stevenson (1993), p. 73.
3See Francillon (1984), pp. 1–2; Gething (1983), pp. 4–5; and Francillon (1990b), pp. 298–299.
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 105
Force mounted. One group of dissenters, later known as the “Fighter Mafia,”
led by John Boyd, Pierre Sprey, and others, began arguing with considerable
effect against such a fighter within the Air Force and the DoD. This group advocated
procurement of a much lighter, highly maneuverable dogfighter optimized
for close-in air combat.
The influence of this group on the highest levels of the Pentagon increased
dramatically in 1966 when Boyd came to the Air Staff, Requirements, Tactical
Division, and Sprey joined the acquisition staff of OSD. Boyd was an experienced
fighter pilot who was the author of the air combat training manual used
at the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base. As an engineering student
at Georgia Tech in 1962, Boyd expanded and applied to fighter aircraft a
mathematical theory (previously published for analysis of general aviation)
relating weight, drag, thrust, and lift characteristics to maneuvering performance.
Later developed into the “Energy Maneuverability Concept” with
mathematician Tom Christie, this theory helped the Fighter Mafia’s supporters
translate their air maneuverability requirements directly into aircraft engineering
design requirements. Sprey, a former operations research analyst at
Grumman involved in the development of the Missileer and the F-111B concepts,
strongly supported Boyd’s views. In early 1967, Boyd and Sprey mounted
a coordinated assault on the Aeronautical Systems Division’s 60,000-lb. multirole
variable-geometry fighter-bomber concept for the F-X.4
Throughout the first half of 1967, Boyd and Sprey conducted extensive design
trade-off analyses to support their argument for a highly maneuverable, dedicated
air-superiority fighter. Largely through such efforts, a smaller, more
maneuverable F-X concept called Blue Bird emerged in the spring of 1967.
Debate continued with no action being taken, however, until the revelation of
new Soviet fighters galvanized opinion in OSD and the Air Force around the
Blue Bird concept. In July 1967, at an air show at the Domodedovo airfield near
Moscow, the Soviet air force revealed two new highly capable fighters: the MiG-
25 Foxbat and the MiG-23 Flogger. Many officials in the Pentagon believed that
these new fighters, particularly the MiG-25, would be difficult for the F-4 or
other existing U.S. tactical fighters to counter. This revelation tremendously
reinforced the arguments for a specialized, highly maneuverable air-superiority
fighter uncompromised by multirole air-to-ground capabilities.5
______________
4Other leaders of the Fighter Mafia included Everest Riccioni, an experienced F-100C pilot; Charles
(“Chuck”) Myers, a former test pilot and Navy fighter pilot who worked for Lockheed on the development
of the lightweight F-104; John Chuprun at Wright Patterson AFB; Richard Willis at Nellis
AFB; and Al Price at the Air Force Academy. The account presented here draws on a variety of open
sources, as well as on interviews the principal author conducted with Boyd, October 8, 1980;
Christie, September 19, 1980; Myers, September 24, 1980; and Sprey, September 19, 1980.
5Ironically, neither of the two new Soviet fighters proved to be outstanding dogfighters, particularly
the MiG-25, which allegedly had been developed to counter the Mach 3 XB-70 strategic bomber.
106 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
In response to these and other factors, the Air Force sent out a new RFP in
August to seven contractors for a new round of design studies. In December
1967, the Air Force awarded study contracts to the two winning firms:
McDonnell-Douglas and General Dynamics. Three other historic Air Force
fighter R&D leaders—North American, Lockheed, and Fairchild-Republic—as
well as Grumman, also took part in the design study using their own corporate
funds. Although considerable debate still existed within the Air Force over
design configuration, weight, and multirole capabilities for the F-X, most Air
Force officials now supported an air-superiority fighter and strongly opposed
compromising the capabilities of the future F-X by requiring it to fulfill carrierbased
Navy or ground-attack missions.
Indeed, with the unhappy experience of the TFX continuing to unfold, both
Navy and Air Force resistance continued to grow to OSD’s concept of a joint
F-X/VFAX program. As the Air Force struggled to hammer out a consensus on
performance requirements for an all–Air Force F-X, the Navy tactical fighter
community, allied with Grumman, increasingly sought to cancel the F-111B
program and replace it with a new R&D effort for an all-Navy fighter optimized
for fleet air defense and uncompromised by requirements for the Air Force
strike-attack or air-superiority missions.6
Like Pierre Sprey, many pilots in the Navy tactical fighter community had been
ambivalent from the very beginning about the stand-off “Missileer” concept of
fleet air defense that had been passed on from the canceled Douglas F6D-1 to
the F-111B. Even fewer in the Navy favored the joint Navy–Air Force development
of the TFX as a replacement for the canceled Missileer. These concerns
increased as developmental problems and performance shortcomings began to
emerge on the Navy F-111B program. Shortly after flight testing of the F-111B
prototype began in May 1965, two serious problems soon became evident:
excessive weight growth, and compressor stalls caused by the engine inlet
design. Other problems included poor pilot visibility on approach to carrier
landings. Extensive measures were taken to try to resolve these problems,
including moving the landing gear aft and development of a new nose and a
higher-thrust engine. Grumman initiated two major weight-reduction programs.
7
Insurmountable opposition in the Navy to continuing the F-111B finally
emerged in response to the same event that crystallized Air Force support for an
__________________________________________________ ______________________
Nonetheless, the F-4 did not have the altitude and speed capabilities to deal effectively with the
MiG-25.
6The following account is drawn from Coulam (1977), Stevenson (1975), and Art (1968).
7With a touch of humor, Grumman called these programs SWIP for Super Weight Improvement
Program and CWIP for Colossal Weight Improvement Program.
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 107
F-X optimized for air superiority: the revelation of new Soviet fighters at the
Moscow Air Show in July 1967. The existence of new-generation Russian fighters,
combined with the renewed appreciation for the importance of maneuverability
and dogfighting gained from air combat experience over Vietnam, led
the Navy to argue convincingly for the need for a specialized Navy fighter
optimized for carrier-based fleet air defense. The Navy soon awarded a contract
to Grumman for a study evaluating the F-111B’s capabilities in combat
against the new Soviet fighters. In October, Grumman reported that the F-111B
would not be able to cope with the new Russian fighters in a dogfight. More
importantly, Grumman submitted an unsolicited design proposal, based on
company design studies under way since 1966, for a totally new fighter that
could meet the Navy’s fleet air-defense needs.8 Shortly thereafter, two other
historic Navy fighter developers—LTV (Vought) and McDonnell-Douglas—also
submitted design proposals, as did a seasoned Air Force fighter developer,
North American Rockwell.9 All these companies, with the exception of LTV,
were also active participants in the Air Force F-X design studies. At around the
same time, the Navy informed General Dynamics that the F-111B did not meet
its requirements and initiated a new study of alternatives.
The Navy campaign to cancel the F-111B and develop its own fighter gained
momentum at the end of 1967 when OSD appointed the Air Force as the executive
agent for the development of a single new engine for a joint F-X/VFAX. By
this time, both the Navy and Air Force were fully committed to developing their
own fighters uncompromised by mission requirements from the other service,
and the Navy now saw the Air Force as getting the upper hand in the OSDsupported
F-X/VFAX program. The Navy campaign finally succeeded six
months later in July 1968 when Congress agreed to terminate the F-111B program.
That same month, the Navy sent out RFPs to industry for a new VFX
fighter, developed solely under Navy auspices and optimized for the fleet airdefense
mission. In addition to Grumman, North American, LTV, and
McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics also submitted design proposals.
As noted earlier, by late 1967 when Navy officials had ratcheted up their campaign
to cancel the F-111B, the lighter, more maneuverable Blue Bird F-X had
gained widespread acceptance in the Air Force. At this time, however, Boyd,
Sprey, and other members of the Fighter Mafia intensified their efforts to influence
the F-X configuration toward an even smaller, less complicated, more
maneuverable LWF. By the spring of 1968, they had formulated a new “Red
Bird” F-X concept, which called for a lower-cost, even lighter fighter with lower
______________
8However, Grumman proposed retention of a swing-wing design and many F-111B systems, such as
the engines.
9In 1967, North American merged with Rockwell Standard to become North American Rockwell.
108 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
wing loading, fixed inlets, a low-bypass turbofan, and less-complex avionics.
Some elements within the Air Force strongly supported Red Bird as a means of
procuring larger numbers of fighters because of its lower procurement costs,
but the same views that had undermined the F-104 program and prevented
procurement of the F-5 remained prevalent. Furthermore, following the
cancellation of the F-111B in mid-1968, Air Force officials realized that a rapid
consensus had to be achieved on F-X to discourage OSD from folding the F-X
requirement into the Navy VFX RFP. By the fall of 1968, Air Force consensus
had essentially been achieved on the Blue Bird F-X concept with fixed wings.10
Although the Red Bird advocates were forced to admit defeat for the time being,
they clearly had been instrumental in preventing approval of a heavy multirole
F-X concept similar to the TFX/F-111.11
On September 30, 1968, the Air Force sent out a new F-X RFP based on the Blue
Bird concept to eight prime contractors. Only four companies responded with
serious proposals. Not surprisingly, these were General Dynamics, North
American, and Fairchild-Republic—the three historic Air Force fighter developers—
and McDonnell-Douglas—the emerging U.S. industry leader in fighter
R&D. After eliminating General Dynamics from the competition, the Air Force
awarded contracts for a six-month project-definition phase to the remaining
three contractors on December 30, 1968. In an apparent confirmation of service
displeasure with the entire TFX affair, the Navy also eliminated General
Dynamics from the VFX competition the same month, along with LTV and
North American, leaving Grumman and McDonnell-Douglas as finalists.
This decision presented McDonnell-Douglas with a chance to win both the F-X
and VFX competitions, thereby reinforcing the already dominant biservice
position it had won through the F-4 program. On the other hand, Grumman,
North American, and Republic all found themselves in “must-win” situations.
If they did not win their respective competitions, they could not expect to
remain leaders in high-performance tactical fighter R&D. Indeed, LTV’s elimination
from the VFX competition essentially meant the end of its history as a
prime contractor for Navy fighters.
The VFX competition concluded rapidly. In mid-January 1969, the Navy
selected Grumman to develop the VFX, later designated the F-14A Tomcat.
Observers widely anticipated Grumman’s selection for several reasons. First
and foremost, Grumman remained the historic leader in Navy tactical fighter
development and had continued to gain additional experience on the F-111B
______________
10Variable-geometry variants had also been examined.
11Francillon (1984), p. 2.
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Photo 5.1—The Lockheed (formerly General Dynamics) F-16 Fighting Falcon became the most numerous fighter in the
U.S. Air Force inventory in the 1980s and 1990s. This highly successful fighter has evolved through many variants and has
remained one of the world’s most effective combat aircraft.
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 109
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Photo 5.2—The McDonnell-Douglas F-15C Eagle, first flown in July 1972, remained the premier air-superiority fighter in
the U.S. Air Force inventory throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
110 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 111
program. Second, to convince OSD to support the VFX program, the Navy had
argued that the new fighter would save money by drawing on subsystems, technology,
design lessons, and other aspects of the floundering F-111B program.
As the lead contractor of the F-111B, Grumman was much better positioned to
support this approach than was McDonnell. For example, officials expected the
VFX to use the same engines as the F-111. Grumman had already expended
several years on design studies for the VFX air inlets and engine nozzles to avoid
the engine performance and stall problems encountered on the F-111. In
another example, Grumman developed a concept for a welded titanium wing
box to avoid the weight growth and performance problems encountered on the
bolted metal variable-geometry wing box for the F-111.12
The F-X competition took somewhat longer to resolve. In June 1969,
McDonnell-Douglas, North American, and Fairchild-Republic submitted their
final design proposals for the F-X, now designated the F-15. After six months of
extensive Air Force and OSD evaluations, the secretary of the Air Force
announced on December 23, 1969, the selection of McDonnell-Douglas to
develop the F-15. Unlike the F-111 contest, no significant disagreements
emerged within the government regarding selection of a winner. Nearly all
published accounts agree that the McDonnell-Douglas design submission won
on technical merit.
According to some sources, a major factor contributing to the success of the St.
Louis company’s design was its recent experience in developing the F-4 and
other high-performance fighters intended for deployment aboard carriers.
Because of its design studies for the VFX and other factors, McDonnell-Douglas
rejected a variable-geometry wing for the F-15 as too complex, expensive, and
heavy. But the St. Louis company, along with the other two finalists, suffered
from a lack of aerodynamic data for evaluating various fixed-wing planforms
optimized for high maneuverability and agility. Neither NASA nor the leading
contractors had done studies on such wings since the early 1950s. All three F-X
competitors conducted hundreds of hours of wind-tunnel testing in hopes of
developing the best design configuration. North American eventually developed
a blended wing configuration similar to that General Dynamics developed
for the YF-16 in the early 1970s. Republic, drawing on its experience with the
F-105 in Vietnam, came up with a design featuring widely separated engine
nacelles for greater survivability. McDonnell-Douglas’s design, however, benefited
from the company’s long experience at developing high-performance
fighters that required low approach speeds at high angles of attack for carrier
landings. The capability to perform at high angles of attack was a critical factor
in fighter maneuverability and agility, but few wind-tunnel data existed in this
______________
12Stevenson (1975), pp. 16–18.
112 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
area. McDonnell-Douglas’s experience in this area helped immensely during
its evaluation of over 800 wing designs and variations.13
On the whole, the F-15 and F-14 fighters proved to be extremely successful,
although the Tomcat R&D program experienced considerable controversy in
the early 1970s because of high costs and other factors. First delivered to the Air
Force in November 1974, the F-15 Eagle rapidly became viewed as the premier
air-superiority fighter in the Air Force inventory. In early 1984, the Air Force
selected an extensively modified version called the F-15E Strike Eagle for the allweather
deep-attack mission to complement the aging F-111. By the mid-
1990s, well over two decades after the F-15’s initial entry into service, most
observers still considered the Eagle to be the most capable air-superiority
fighter in the world. Benefiting from a major upgrade program in the 1990s, the
F-14 also continued on in Navy service and remained the world’s premier carrier-
based fighter. The F-14 program confirmed Grumman’s position as the
leader for more than four decades in Navy fighter R&D, while the F-15 effort
indisputably established McDonnell-Douglas as America’s foremost developer
of USAF fighter aircraft during Period 2.
THE F-16 AND F/A-18: LIGHTER, LOWER-COST ADDITIONS
Despite the great success that the F-14 and F-15 eventually enjoyed, concerns
continued to mount during the R&D programs for these fighters that the
unchecked growth in fighter R&D and procurement costs could not be sustained.
Many observers believed that growing costs would inevitably lead to
dramatic cuts in planned procurement numbers, which in turn would result in
a dangerous decline in the overall size and capabilities of the force structure.
Some Pentagon officials began advocating development of cheaper,
lightweight, less capable fighters that could be procured in larger numbers.
Combined with the F-14 and F-15, these fighters would produce a larger force
structure composed of a “high-low” mix of capabilities. At the same time, the
Fighter Mafia, led by Boyd and Sprey, which had always argued that the F-14
and F-15 “Blue Bird” were too large and complex, continued to argue effectively
for procurement of cheaper LWFs.14
With the start of the Nixon administration in 1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard initiated a wide-ranging
______________
13See Ethell (1981), pp. 15-17; Stevenson (1978), pp. 14-16; and Delusach (1970).
14Boyd and most of the rest of the Fighter Mafia did not, however, accept the assumption that
lighter and simpler meant less capable. They argued that complicated, expensive modern fighters
did not work well in real combat situations and had poor reliability and maintenance records.
Larger numbers of simpler, more agile, more robust, and more reliable fighters, they argued, would
actually provide greater overall combat capability for the total force structure.
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 113
review of Pentagon acquisition policy. Packard rapidly gravitated toward several
major acquisition reforms that RAND and others had advocated since the
early McNamara years, including design-to-cost, competitive prototyping, and
fly-before-buy concepts.15
Packard’s newfound enthusiasm for prototyping led him on a quest for suitable
candidate systems from all the services. The deputy secretary particularly
favored an LWF as a prototype candidate because of growing cost problems
with new fighters. In 1970, the Navy F-14 fighter R&D program began experiencing
severe cost-growth problems.16 By mid-1971, Packard had slashed the
anticipated F-14 buy in half and indefinitely postponed the procurement of the
F-14B version with higher-thrust and improved engines. At the same time, the
F-15 program was progressing well, the aircraft would clearly be expensive.
Even though the Air Force leadership had reached a consensus on the F-15
requirement in mid-1968 based on the Blue Bird F-X concept, the Fighter Mafia
had continued to refine their Red Bird concept for a lighter-weight fighter.
These studies led to an even lighter, simpler, more maneuverable fighter proposal
dubbed the F-XX. General Dynamics and Northrop—the latter company
a strong advocate of the LWF concept since the early 1950s—conducted extensive
design trade-off studies on the F-XX proposal. LWF advocates within the
Navy also began promoting a small, austere fighter concept labeled the VFXX as
a backup if the F-14 program problems worsened. Soon contractors began
more actively trying to exploit these trends. During discussions with the secretary
of the Air Force in late 1970, Lockheed officials proposed development of a
low-cost LWF, the CL-1200, derived from the original F-104 design. Word of
this action set off a flood of unsolicited design proposals from other contractors
for LWF prototypes. In the first six months of 1971, Northrop, Boeing, and LTV
followed Lockheed with serious LWF design proposals. Lockheed, LTV, and
North American also began LWF design studies for a Navy VFXX.17
Throughout the first half of 1971, Deputy Secretary Packard and other Pentagon
officials became increasingly convinced of the potential benefits of funding a
relatively low-cost program for the competitive development and fly-off of LWF
prototypes. Such a program not only would provide a candidate LWF prototype
to supplement the F-14 and F-15 if desired, but also could serve as a means of
evaluating a variety of proposed acquisition reforms, such as competitive proto-
______________
15Many of these reforms involved proof testing of actual hardware before major decisions were
made and thus differed dramatically from McNamara’s systems analysis approach and “paper
competitions.” See Rich et al. (1986).
16This cost-growth was largely attributable to Grumman’s unrealistically low cost estimates during
the final design competition with McDonnell-Douglas. See Sponsler et al. (1973), p. 29.
17Stevenson (1993), pp. 101–104.
114 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
typing and performance-based requirements. In January 1972, RFPs for an
LWF prototype were sent out to nine contractors. Only the five companies that
had been involved in earlier LWF design studies responded: Boeing, General
Dynamics, Northrop, LTV, and Lockheed. There is some dispute in the open
literature over the ranking that emerged from the technical evaluation of the
designs these companies submitted. However, several sources suggest that
government officials considered the designs of Boeing, General Dynamics, and
Northrop to be clearly superior and roughly comparable. On April 13, 1972, the
government awarded contracts to General Dynamics and Northrop to develop
their prototype LWFs for a flight-demonstration program. In practice, this
evolved into an intensely competitive fly-off between the two technology
demonstrators for an FSD contract, although officially it remained a technology
demonstration program.
The outcome of the design competition surprised few observers. General
Dynamics and Northrop had been working closely with the Fighter Mafia, conducting
design studies for an LWF since the earliest days of the Red Bird concept
and F-XX. General Dynamics drew heavily on these years of design studies,
as well as on its extensive experience gained developing the F-111 and its
earlier fighters. General Dynamics’ model 401 cleverly blended together for the
first time a variety of cutting-edge technologies and concepts, including a
variable-camber, blended-body configuration and an FBW flight-control system
to optimize maneuverability and agility while controlling cost. General
Dynamics’ ability to develop such an impressive design clearly stemmed in
large part from its years of fighter R&D experience and LWF design studies.18
Northrop’s winning P600 design proposal emerged from a long line of earlier
Northrop LWF design concepts. Northrop had been working on LWF designs
for nearly 20 years, beginning with its N-102 Fang, the forerunner of its T-38
trainer and F-5A export fighter. In 1970, the Pentagon awarded Northrop a
development contract for a new International Fighter Aircraft. Northrop had
won out over Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, and LTV designs with a modified
and upgraded version of its lightweight Freedom Fighter, later designated the
F-5E. The all-new Northrop P530 Cobra LWF design emerged from extensive
studies conducted almost continuously since 1965 to develop a follow-on to the
F-5. The P600 design the Pentagon selected for the LWF fly-off with General
Dynamics was a refinement of the P530.19
______________
18Stevenson (1993), pp. 145–148.
19See Anderson (1976). Also in 1970, Northrop and Fairchild-Republic had won the Pentagon’s A-X
competition to develop prototypes of a relatively simple, low-cost attack aircraft for a competitive
fly-off. In January 1973, the Pentagon selected Republic’s YA-10 prototype over the Northrop YA-9
for full-scale development.
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 115
Although Lockheed had also been a pioneer of LWF development, its CL-1200
Lancer design proposal suffered from several perceived disadvantages. First,
many did not view it as a new design but as only a modification of the earlier
F-104, a design that had not achieved widespread support in the Air Force.
Second, the CL-1200 clearly had been marketed for several years prior to the
LWF competition as an export fighter, as was the F-5, as a replacement for
F-104Gs in European air forces. Furthermore, Lockheed had not developed a
conventional mainstream tactical fighter for nearly 20 years; many observers
were unfamiliar with its superlative “black” programs, such as the SR-71.
Boeing suffered even more from the perception of lack of experience. During
the design evaluation, Secretary of the Air Force Seamans allegedly pointed out
that “Boeing had not ever fired an afterburner in anger.”20 Lockheed designer
Kelly Johnson agreed, allegedly pointing out in his journal that Boeing “had
never built a modern fighter, lit an afterburner or had a supersonic airplane.”21
Both LWF prototypes first flew in 1974. Throughout the last half of the year,
military and civilian test pilots flew the General Dynamics and Northrop prototypes—
now designated YF-16 and YF-17, respectively—in an intensely competitive
fly-off. In January 1975, the secretary of the Air Force announced that
General Dynamics’ YF-16 had been selected for full-scale development. The
resulting F-16 Fighting Falcon went on to become the most numerous fighter in
the Air Force inventory and one of the most widely exported fighters of the last
several decades. However, the F-16 quickly evolved away from the early LWF
concept the Fighter Mafia had envisioned in the 1960s, as it developed into a
much heavier, much more capable multirole fighter-bomber.22
In 1975, most observers assumed that, in accordance with the wishes of
Congress, the Navy would procure a navalized version of the YF-16 to supplement
the F-14. Yet the Navy was unhappy with both the YF-16, as selected by
the Air Force, and the YF-17. Both aircraft clearly had to be modified considerably
to be made suitable for use aboard aircraft carriers. Furthermore, the Navy
wanted an attack fighter, not a lightweight dogfighter, in part because it wanted
to reserve the fleet air-defense mission for the F-14.
______________
20Stevenson (1993), p. 144.
21From Kelly Johnson’s personal log dated January 6, 1972, as quoted in Stevenson (1993), p. 143.
22It has been claimed that the F-16 gained a pound of weight for every day that passed since its first
flight. The early Block 5, 10, and 15 versions are close to the original Fighter Mafia concept of an
austere, daylight dogfighter. The Block 25 and 30 versions were essentially developed as
replacements for the multirole F-4 fighter-attack aircraft and were equipped for long-range, radarguided
missile capability. The Block 40 has an enhanced air-to-ground capability, which includes
LANTIRN and Maverick options. The most recent and highly capable Block 50 version is an
extremely versatile world-class multirole fighter bomber.
116 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
Both LWF contractors teamed with traditional Navy fighter developers to design
navalized versions: General Dynamics with LTV, Northrop with McDonnell-
Douglas. In May, the Navy announced the selection of the McDonnell-
Douglas/Northrop team. The teaming arrangement gave leadership to
McDonnell-Douglas, as an experienced Navy fighter developer, on Navy variants,
and to Northrop on any land-based designs. Under the terms of the
teaming arrangement, McDonnell-Douglas engineers significantly modified
and redesigned the YF-17 prototype into a virtually new strike-attack naval
fighter. In recognition of this fact, the aircraft was eventually designated the
McDonnell-Douglas/Northrop F/A-18 Hornet.23 The Hornet became the
standard carrier fighter-attack aircraft for the Navy. In the 1990s, McDonnell-
Douglas radically modified the Hornet into a new, more-capable version called
the F/A-18E.
Thus, by mid-1975, McDonnell-Douglas had become the dominant contractor
on two of the four major new tactical fighter R&D programs of the 1960s and
1970s. McDonnell soon further solidified its position as the U.S. leader in conventional
tactical fighter-attack aircraft by launching a program for a new
Marine V/STOL attack fighter. The same month that the McDonnell-
Douglas/Northrop team won the F/A-18 contract, the St. Louis contractor also
began studies for an advanced version of the British Aerospace AV-8A Harrier.
The Pentagon approved full-scale development of this design in July 1976.
Although broadly based on the British Aerospace Harrier, the new AV-8B
version included newly designed composite wings, a new forward fuselage, air
intakes, cockpit and front exhaust nozzles, and a lengthened rear fuselage. In
short, the AV-8B amounted to a new aircraft.24
With McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics, and Grumman now almost completely
dominant in recent and ongoing fighter R&D, North American Rockwell,
Republic, and LTV struggled on with limited success to remain viable as recognized
prime contractors for fighter development. North American Rockwell
almost succeeded with a new contract in the early 1970s. In late 1971, the Navy
issued RFPs for a new shipborne fighter-attack aircraft called the VFA V/STOL.
Grumman, LTV, General Dynamics, Fairchild-Republic, North American, and
Boeing all submitted serious design proposals. In March 1972, the Navy chose
North American to develop the aircraft, now called the XFV-12A. The General
Dynamics proposal also received follow-on funding. North American went on
______________
23According to one McDonnell-Douglas engineer, “The F/A-18 looks like the YF-17, but it is a brand
new plane, aerodynamically, structurally, in all ways. It’s a brand new airplane from the ground
up...” Quoted in Orr (1991), pp. 51–52.
24Francillon (1990b), pp. 329–331.
Utopia Utopia Bold
Photo 5.3—The Northrop YF-17 competed unsuccessfully with the General Dynamics YF-16 in a fly-off in mid-1974 to
become the Air Force lightweight fighter. Later, Northrop teamed with McDonnell-Douglas to develop the YF-17 into the
highly successful Navy F/A-18 Hornet.
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 117
Utopia Utopia Bold
Photo 5.4—The A-10 Thunderbolt II, which first flew in May 1972, became Republic’s last production combat aircraft.
Selected by the Air Force after competitive flight tests with the Northrop YA-9, the Thunderbolt II proved to be a highly
effective ground-attack aircraft and served with distinction during Desert Storm.
118 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 119
to build a technology-demonstrator aircraft, which was not successful.25 The
Navy eventually canceled the program once the AV-8B R&D effort got under
way. North American also received a contract in the late 1970s to develop the
Highly Maneuverable Technology (HiMAT) remotely piloted vehicle to examine
supermaneuverable fighter design concepts. HiMAT contributed to the later
X-31 technology-demonstrator program with Germany’s Deutsche Aerospace,
but this did not result in a fighter R&D effort. North American Rockwell
remained a leading bomber developer and continued to build its military aircraft
R&D experience through its important B-1A and B-1B strategic bomber
programs.
Fairchild-Republic completed development of its A-10 Thunderbolt II attack
aircraft, which had won a design and prototype competition with the Northrop
YA-9. Production commenced in 1975.26 The A-10 proved to be a lethal closeair
support aircraft. Nonetheless, the ungainly but deadly A-10 was destined to
be Republic’s last combat aircraft. The firm won a contract in mid-1982 in
competition with Rockwell, LTV, and General Dynamics to develop the T-46
trainer for the Air Force. Cost growth and technical problems led to the cancellation
of the program in 1987, leading to the demise of the aviation division of
Fairchild-Republic. In 1988, the site of Republic Aviation, the birthplace of the
famed P-47 Thunderbolt, was sold, later to become a shopping mall.27
Having failed to win a fighter R&D contract since the F-8 Crusader in the 1950s
or any major combat aircraft contract since the A-7 in the early 1960s, LTV
evolved into a highly successful subcontractor. By the 1980s, LTV began specializing
in the manufacture of large composite structures and later became a
key subcontractor on important military aircraft R&D efforts.
OVERALL TRENDS IN THE 1960s AND 1970s
Most of the trends identified at the end of Chapter Three as characteristic of the
first period of jet-fighter R&D were still in evidence throughout the 1960s to the
mid-1970s. However, in contrast to the 1945–1961 period, two fundamental
characteristics of the second period stand out above all others: continuity of
leadership in fighter R&D and exits from the fighter R&D business.
The continuity of leadership in fighter R&D evident in the second period clearly
shows the central importance of experience during this era. While several
______________
25Stevenson (1993), pp. 148–150. The V/STOL technology did not work as well as initially anticipated.
26Fairchild-Republic manufactured the A-10 at the same location where it had made the original
Thunderbolt of World War II fame, the P-47.
27Stoff (1990), pp. 183–190.
120 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
prime contractors in effect exited from the fighter business during this period,
no new entrants came in to take their place. This suggests that, compared to
the earlier period, the 1960s to the mid-1970s were a time of relatively less radical
technological change—at least in overall engine and platform design and
development. The slower pace of advance in platforms apparently enhanced
the relative importance of contractors’ system-specific experience.
Experience and Specialization: The Continuity of Leadership
Nine prime contractors designed and flew a total of at least 40 distinct jet fighter
designs during the 1940s and 1950s.28 In 1961 at the beginning of the second
period, five of these contractors remained widely recognized leaders in Air
Force fighter R&D: General Dynamics/Convair, North American, Republic,
Lockheed, and Northrop. Between 1945 and 1961, these five contractors developed
and flew a total of 22 fighter and eight bomber designs. Convair, North
American, and Republic constituted the first tier of fighter developers for the Air
Force, with a total of 15 fighter designs and seven bomber designs among them
that were developed and flown. Lockheed and Northrop made up a second tier
of fighter developers for the Air Force, having flown seven fighter and one
bomber designs during Period 1. The four leading Navy fighter developers—
Grumman, McDonnell, Vought, and Douglas—designed and flew a total of 18
fighters during Period 1.
Between 1961 and 1977, the number of distinct new tactical fighter designs
developed and flown declined significantly to under ten. As a result, four contractors
in effect exited from the fighter R&D business because of their failure to
win new contracts. These included two from the former first tier of Air Force
developers—North American and Republic—and two Navy contractors—
Douglas and Vought.
Yet the most active and successful fighter developers at the end of the second
period remained the same companies that had held leadership positions at the
end of the 1950s, as shown in Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Thus, General
Dynamics/Convair, arguably the leading developer along with North American,
of Air Force combat aircraft at the end of the 1950s, retained a position of leadership
by developing the F-111 and F-16. Grumman held on to the leadership
position it had first acquired back in the 1930s by developing the F-14 and
modifications of the A-6 Intruder naval attack aircraft. Northrop, long having
specialized in the development of LWFs, teamed with McDonnell-Douglas for
development of the F/A-18.
______________
28If technology demonstrators and fighterlike X-planes are included, this number rises to 73.
Utopia Utopia Bold
SOURCE: RAND database.
RAND MR939-5.1
62 61 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
TType of Aircraft
Fighter
Reconnaissance
Trainer
Transport (MIL)
Transport (CIV)
Fighter
Bomber
Reconnaissance
Unmanned Vehicle
Transport (CIV)
Fighter
Transport (MIL)
Miscellaneous
Unmanned Vehicle
Transport (CIV)
Fighter
Bomber
Reconnaissance
Trainer
Fighter
Bomber
Reconnaissance
Transport (MIL)
Miscellaneous
Year
Firm
McDonnell-
Douglas
General
Dynamics
Lockheed
Northrop
Grumman



103
Chapter Five
REVIVAL OF THE AIR-SUPERIORITY FIGHTER
INTRODUCTION
The late 1960s and 1970s witnessed the development of two new Air Force
fighters—the F-15 and F-16—and two new Navy fighters—the F-14 and
F/A-18—that would become the mainstays of America’s tactical fighter forces
for the remainder of the century. In particular, the two Air Force fighters and
the F/A-18 represent a substantial change from many of the trends evident in
previous fighter modernization decisions. The F-15 was the first Air Force
fighter since the development of the North American F-86 in the late 1940s that
was optimized for maneuverability and agility for dogfights with enemy fighters.
In an even more dramatic departure from recent experience, the F-16 and
F/A-18 programs attempted to reverse the trends toward heavier, more complex
and costly fighters.
These changes did not come easily. They resulted from a long, arduous, and
turbulent process during which various schools of thought on fighter doctrine
and design vied for influence. Nonetheless, these often vitriolic debates ended
in the design and development of several of the world’s most capable fighters.
OF EAGLES AND TOMCATS
As early as 1964, a consensus began to emerge within the Air Force that a new
tactical fighter was needed. This consensus in part reflected Air Force dissatisfaction
with the TFX program and McNamara’s policy of fighter commonality
among the services. Under McNamara’s guidance, the Air Force took the
unprecedented step of procuring two Navy-developed combat aircraft, the F-4
and the A-7, and agreed to develop the F-105 replacement as the joint TFX program
with the Navy. As serious developmental problems emerged on the TFX
program that indicated that the F-111 would not be able to meet all of its multirole,
multiservice performance requirements, various influential elements
104 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
within the Air Force increasingly voiced the desire for a tactical fighter developed
by and for the Air Force.1
During the first half of 1965, Air Force officials continued to debate some of the
fundamental issues that still caused concern on the TFX program, such as
multirole ground-attack capability versus air-superiority optimization, and Air
Force–Navy commonality. However, the escalation of the air war over Vietnam
soon convinced many officials in the Air Force and the Pentagon that a new,
specialized air-defense fighter was needed, as antiquated North Vietnamese
MiG-17s began registering victories over much larger, more complex and
expensive, but less maneuverable U.S. fighters. On April 4, 1965, several North
Vietnamese Korean War vintage MiG-17s equipped only with guns shot down
two sophisticated F-105s on a bombing run against the Than Hoa Bridge. This
incident shocked the U.S. tactical fighter community and galvanized sentiment
in the Air Force for a new air-superiority fighter. Shortly thereafter, General
McConnell, Air Force Chief of Staff, issued a formal document emphasizing the
importance of the air-superiority mission. This document served as the basis
for a requirement statement for a new fighter.2
In November 1965, OSD directed the Air Force to procure a version of the
Vought A-7 as its new dedicated attack aircraft. While disappointing to those
who advocated procurement of a higher-performance supersonic fighter-attack
aircraft, such as the Northrop F-5A, for the ground support mission, this decision
nonetheless cleared the way for the later acquisition of a specialized airsuperiority
fighter. In December 1965, the DoD launched a Concept Formulation
Phase for a new fighter, dubbed the F-X, by sending out RFPs soliciting
parametric design studies to 13 contractors. Eight companies responded, and
in March 1966, the DoD awarded study contracts to North American, Lockheed,
and Boeing. Grumman also participated using its own funds.3
However, important elements within OSD and the Air Force remained opposed
to a specialized air-defense fighter, preventing consensus from forming around
any one of the design approaches the participating contractors had advanced.
Many OSD officials still favored a joint Air Force–Navy multirole fighter
(referred to as the F-X–Navy Fighter Attack Aircraft Experimental [VFAX]
requirement) with significant ground-attack capabilities. In addition, the USAF
Aeronautical Systems Division proposed a very large multirole fighter with a
variable-geometry wing with a maximum takeoff gross weight of 60,000 lbs. As
the F-X design evolved toward an aircraft similar to the increasingly controversial
F-111 and as projected R&D costs skyrocketed, opposition within the Air
______________
1Gentry (1976), pp. 9–10.
2Stevenson (1993), p. 73.
3See Francillon (1984), pp. 1–2; Gething (1983), pp. 4–5; and Francillon (1990b), pp. 298–299.
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 105
Force mounted. One group of dissenters, later known as the “Fighter Mafia,”
led by John Boyd, Pierre Sprey, and others, began arguing with considerable
effect against such a fighter within the Air Force and the DoD. This group advocated
procurement of a much lighter, highly maneuverable dogfighter optimized
for close-in air combat.
The influence of this group on the highest levels of the Pentagon increased
dramatically in 1966 when Boyd came to the Air Staff, Requirements, Tactical
Division, and Sprey joined the acquisition staff of OSD. Boyd was an experienced
fighter pilot who was the author of the air combat training manual used
at the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base. As an engineering student
at Georgia Tech in 1962, Boyd expanded and applied to fighter aircraft a
mathematical theory (previously published for analysis of general aviation)
relating weight, drag, thrust, and lift characteristics to maneuvering performance.
Later developed into the “Energy Maneuverability Concept” with
mathematician Tom Christie, this theory helped the Fighter Mafia’s supporters
translate their air maneuverability requirements directly into aircraft engineering
design requirements. Sprey, a former operations research analyst at
Grumman involved in the development of the Missileer and the F-111B concepts,
strongly supported Boyd’s views. In early 1967, Boyd and Sprey mounted
a coordinated assault on the Aeronautical Systems Division’s 60,000-lb. multirole
variable-geometry fighter-bomber concept for the F-X.4
Throughout the first half of 1967, Boyd and Sprey conducted extensive design
trade-off analyses to support their argument for a highly maneuverable, dedicated
air-superiority fighter. Largely through such efforts, a smaller, more
maneuverable F-X concept called Blue Bird emerged in the spring of 1967.
Debate continued with no action being taken, however, until the revelation of
new Soviet fighters galvanized opinion in OSD and the Air Force around the
Blue Bird concept. In July 1967, at an air show at the Domodedovo airfield near
Moscow, the Soviet air force revealed two new highly capable fighters: the MiG-
25 Foxbat and the MiG-23 Flogger. Many officials in the Pentagon believed that
these new fighters, particularly the MiG-25, would be difficult for the F-4 or
other existing U.S. tactical fighters to counter. This revelation tremendously
reinforced the arguments for a specialized, highly maneuverable air-superiority
fighter uncompromised by multirole air-to-ground capabilities.5
______________
4Other leaders of the Fighter Mafia included Everest Riccioni, an experienced F-100C pilot; Charles
(“Chuck”) Myers, a former test pilot and Navy fighter pilot who worked for Lockheed on the development
of the lightweight F-104; John Chuprun at Wright Patterson AFB; Richard Willis at Nellis
AFB; and Al Price at the Air Force Academy. The account presented here draws on a variety of open
sources, as well as on interviews the principal author conducted with Boyd, October 8, 1980;
Christie, September 19, 1980; Myers, September 24, 1980; and Sprey, September 19, 1980.
5Ironically, neither of the two new Soviet fighters proved to be outstanding dogfighters, particularly
the MiG-25, which allegedly had been developed to counter the Mach 3 XB-70 strategic bomber.
106 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
In response to these and other factors, the Air Force sent out a new RFP in
August to seven contractors for a new round of design studies. In December
1967, the Air Force awarded study contracts to the two winning firms:
McDonnell-Douglas and General Dynamics. Three other historic Air Force
fighter R&D leaders—North American, Lockheed, and Fairchild-Republic—as
well as Grumman, also took part in the design study using their own corporate
funds. Although considerable debate still existed within the Air Force over
design configuration, weight, and multirole capabilities for the F-X, most Air
Force officials now supported an air-superiority fighter and strongly opposed
compromising the capabilities of the future F-X by requiring it to fulfill carrierbased
Navy or ground-attack missions.
Indeed, with the unhappy experience of the TFX continuing to unfold, both
Navy and Air Force resistance continued to grow to OSD’s concept of a joint
F-X/VFAX program. As the Air Force struggled to hammer out a consensus on
performance requirements for an all–Air Force F-X, the Navy tactical fighter
community, allied with Grumman, increasingly sought to cancel the F-111B
program and replace it with a new R&D effort for an all-Navy fighter optimized
for fleet air defense and uncompromised by requirements for the Air Force
strike-attack or air-superiority missions.6
Like Pierre Sprey, many pilots in the Navy tactical fighter community had been
ambivalent from the very beginning about the stand-off “Missileer” concept of
fleet air defense that had been passed on from the canceled Douglas F6D-1 to
the F-111B. Even fewer in the Navy favored the joint Navy–Air Force development
of the TFX as a replacement for the canceled Missileer. These concerns
increased as developmental problems and performance shortcomings began to
emerge on the Navy F-111B program. Shortly after flight testing of the F-111B
prototype began in May 1965, two serious problems soon became evident:
excessive weight growth, and compressor stalls caused by the engine inlet
design. Other problems included poor pilot visibility on approach to carrier
landings. Extensive measures were taken to try to resolve these problems,
including moving the landing gear aft and development of a new nose and a
higher-thrust engine. Grumman initiated two major weight-reduction programs.
7
Insurmountable opposition in the Navy to continuing the F-111B finally
emerged in response to the same event that crystallized Air Force support for an
__________________________________________________ ______________________
Nonetheless, the F-4 did not have the altitude and speed capabilities to deal effectively with the
MiG-25.
6The following account is drawn from Coulam (1977), Stevenson (1975), and Art (1968).
7With a touch of humor, Grumman called these programs SWIP for Super Weight Improvement
Program and CWIP for Colossal Weight Improvement Program.
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 107
F-X optimized for air superiority: the revelation of new Soviet fighters at the
Moscow Air Show in July 1967. The existence of new-generation Russian fighters,
combined with the renewed appreciation for the importance of maneuverability
and dogfighting gained from air combat experience over Vietnam, led
the Navy to argue convincingly for the need for a specialized Navy fighter
optimized for carrier-based fleet air defense. The Navy soon awarded a contract
to Grumman for a study evaluating the F-111B’s capabilities in combat
against the new Soviet fighters. In October, Grumman reported that the F-111B
would not be able to cope with the new Russian fighters in a dogfight. More
importantly, Grumman submitted an unsolicited design proposal, based on
company design studies under way since 1966, for a totally new fighter that
could meet the Navy’s fleet air-defense needs.8 Shortly thereafter, two other
historic Navy fighter developers—LTV (Vought) and McDonnell-Douglas—also
submitted design proposals, as did a seasoned Air Force fighter developer,
North American Rockwell.9 All these companies, with the exception of LTV,
were also active participants in the Air Force F-X design studies. At around the
same time, the Navy informed General Dynamics that the F-111B did not meet
its requirements and initiated a new study of alternatives.
The Navy campaign to cancel the F-111B and develop its own fighter gained
momentum at the end of 1967 when OSD appointed the Air Force as the executive
agent for the development of a single new engine for a joint F-X/VFAX. By
this time, both the Navy and Air Force were fully committed to developing their
own fighters uncompromised by mission requirements from the other service,
and the Navy now saw the Air Force as getting the upper hand in the OSDsupported
F-X/VFAX program. The Navy campaign finally succeeded six
months later in July 1968 when Congress agreed to terminate the F-111B program.
That same month, the Navy sent out RFPs to industry for a new VFX
fighter, developed solely under Navy auspices and optimized for the fleet airdefense
mission. In addition to Grumman, North American, LTV, and
McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics also submitted design proposals.
As noted earlier, by late 1967 when Navy officials had ratcheted up their campaign
to cancel the F-111B, the lighter, more maneuverable Blue Bird F-X had
gained widespread acceptance in the Air Force. At this time, however, Boyd,
Sprey, and other members of the Fighter Mafia intensified their efforts to influence
the F-X configuration toward an even smaller, less complicated, more
maneuverable LWF. By the spring of 1968, they had formulated a new “Red
Bird” F-X concept, which called for a lower-cost, even lighter fighter with lower
______________
8However, Grumman proposed retention of a swing-wing design and many F-111B systems, such as
the engines.
9In 1967, North American merged with Rockwell Standard to become North American Rockwell.
108 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
wing loading, fixed inlets, a low-bypass turbofan, and less-complex avionics.
Some elements within the Air Force strongly supported Red Bird as a means of
procuring larger numbers of fighters because of its lower procurement costs,
but the same views that had undermined the F-104 program and prevented
procurement of the F-5 remained prevalent. Furthermore, following the
cancellation of the F-111B in mid-1968, Air Force officials realized that a rapid
consensus had to be achieved on F-X to discourage OSD from folding the F-X
requirement into the Navy VFX RFP. By the fall of 1968, Air Force consensus
had essentially been achieved on the Blue Bird F-X concept with fixed wings.10
Although the Red Bird advocates were forced to admit defeat for the time being,
they clearly had been instrumental in preventing approval of a heavy multirole
F-X concept similar to the TFX/F-111.11
On September 30, 1968, the Air Force sent out a new F-X RFP based on the Blue
Bird concept to eight prime contractors. Only four companies responded with
serious proposals. Not surprisingly, these were General Dynamics, North
American, and Fairchild-Republic—the three historic Air Force fighter developers—
and McDonnell-Douglas—the emerging U.S. industry leader in fighter
R&D. After eliminating General Dynamics from the competition, the Air Force
awarded contracts for a six-month project-definition phase to the remaining
three contractors on December 30, 1968. In an apparent confirmation of service
displeasure with the entire TFX affair, the Navy also eliminated General
Dynamics from the VFX competition the same month, along with LTV and
North American, leaving Grumman and McDonnell-Douglas as finalists.
This decision presented McDonnell-Douglas with a chance to win both the F-X
and VFX competitions, thereby reinforcing the already dominant biservice
position it had won through the F-4 program. On the other hand, Grumman,
North American, and Republic all found themselves in “must-win” situations.
If they did not win their respective competitions, they could not expect to
remain leaders in high-performance tactical fighter R&D. Indeed, LTV’s elimination
from the VFX competition essentially meant the end of its history as a
prime contractor for Navy fighters.
The VFX competition concluded rapidly. In mid-January 1969, the Navy
selected Grumman to develop the VFX, later designated the F-14A Tomcat.
Observers widely anticipated Grumman’s selection for several reasons. First
and foremost, Grumman remained the historic leader in Navy tactical fighter
development and had continued to gain additional experience on the F-111B
______________
10Variable-geometry variants had also been examined.
11Francillon (1984), p. 2.
Utopia Utopia Bold
Photo 5.1—The Lockheed (formerly General Dynamics) F-16 Fighting Falcon became the most numerous fighter in the
U.S. Air Force inventory in the 1980s and 1990s. This highly successful fighter has evolved through many variants and has
remained one of the world’s most effective combat aircraft.
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 109
Utopia Utopia Bold
Photo 5.2—The McDonnell-Douglas F-15C Eagle, first flown in July 1972, remained the premier air-superiority fighter in
the U.S. Air Force inventory throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
110 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter 111
program. Second, to convince OSD to support the VFX program, the Navy had
argued that the new fighter would save money by drawing on subsystems, technology,
design lessons, and other aspects of the floundering F-111B program.
As the lead contractor of the F-111B, Grumman was much better positioned to
support this approach than was McDonnell. For example, officials expected the
VFX to use the same engines as the F-111. Grumman had already expended
several years on design studies for the VFX air inlets and engine nozzles to avoid
the engine performance and stall problems encountered on the F-111. In
another example, Grumman developed a concept for a welded titanium wing
box to avoid the weight growth and performance problems encountered on the
bolted metal variable-geometry wing box for the F-111.12
The F-X competition took somewhat longer to resolve. In June 1969,
McDonnell-Douglas, North American, and Fairchild-Republic submitted their
final design proposals for the F-X, now designated the F-15. After six months of
extensive Air Force and OSD evaluations, the secretary of the Air Force
announced on December 23, 1969, the selection of McDonnell-Douglas to
develop the F-15. Unlike the F-111 contest, no significant disagreements
emerged within the government regarding selection of a winner. Nearly all
published accounts agree that the McDonnell-Douglas design submission won
on technical merit.
According to some sources, a major factor contributing to the success of the St.
Louis company’s design was its recent experience in developing the F-4 and
other high-performance fighters intended for deployment aboard carriers.
Because of its design studies for the VFX and other factors, McDonnell-Douglas
rejected a variable-geometry wing for the F-15 as too complex, expensive, and
heavy. But the St. Louis company, along with the other two finalists, suffered
from a lack of aerodynamic data for evaluating various fixed-wing planforms
optimized for high maneuverability and agility. Neither NASA nor the leading
contractors had done studies on such wings since the early 1950s. All three F-X
competitors conducted hundreds of hours of wind-tunnel testing in hopes of
developing the best design configuration. North American eventually developed
a blended wing configuration similar to that General Dynamics developed
for the YF-16 in the early 1970s. Republic, drawing on its experience with the
F-105 in Vietnam, came up with a design featuring widely separated engine
nacelles for greater survivability. McDonnell-Douglas’s design, however, benefited
from the company’s long experience at developing high-performance
fighters that required low approach speeds at high angles of attack for carrier
landings. The capability to perform at high angles of attack was a critical factor
in fighter maneuverability and agility, but few wind-tunnel data existed in this
______________
12Stevenson (1975), pp. 16–18.
112 The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D
area. McDonnell-Douglas’s experience in this area helped immensely during
its evaluation of over 800 wing designs and variations.13
On the whole, the F-15 and F-14 fighters proved to be extremely successful,
although the Tomcat R&D program experienced considerable controversy in
the early 1970s because of high costs and other factors. First delivered to the Air
Force in November 1974, the F-15 Eagle rapidly became viewed as the premier
air-superiority fighter in the Air Force inventory. In early 1984, the Air Force
selected an extensively modified version called the F-15E Strike Eagle for the allweather
deep-attack mission to complement the aging F-111. By the mid-
1990s, well over two decades after the F-15’s initial entry into service, most
observers still considered the Eagle to be the most capable air-superiority
fighter in the world. Benefiting from a major upgrade program in the 1990s, the
F-14 also continued on in Navy service and remained the world’s premier carrier-
based fighter. The F-14 program confirmed Grumman’s position as the
leader for more than four decades in Navy fighter R&D, while the F-15 effort
indisputably established McDonnell-Douglas as America’s foremost developer
of USAF fighter aircraft during Period 2.
THE F-16 AND F/A-18: LIGHTER, LOWER-COST ADDITIONS
Despite the great success that the F-14 and F-15 eventually enjoyed, concerns
continued to mount during the R&D programs for these fighters th

[Жора]

Дааа... Жаль, сюда китайцы не ходят. Или японцы. Или индусы. :shock: Посты такого объёма на их родном языке читать было бы ещё веселее.

[Lupus Sapiens]

Дааа... Жаль, сюда китайцы не ходят. Или японцы. Или индусы. :shock: Посты такого объёма на их родном языке читать было бы ещё веселее.

Просто это единственная доступная на форуме метода борьбы с кадрами типа Виггена))).

[Viggen]

Просто это единственная доступная на форуме метода борьбы с кадрами типа Виггена))).

Проще :) . Это единственная доступная интеллекту milstar'а манера поведения.