В воспоминаниях отставного офицера ВВС Ирака Абдул Рахмана аль-Обейди описан эпизод начала эксплуатации МиГ-25 иракскими летчиками. Как и положено, перед получением новой техники, в СССР была отправлена на переучивание группа офицеров ранее летавших на истребителях МиГ-21. Получив необходимый опыт группа вернулась в Ирак, а вот с поставкой новых самолетов произошла задержка, поэтому летчики продолжали выполнять полеты на МиГ-21. Но после того, как с боевого задания над Персидским Заливом не вернулся ст.л-т Махмуд Ахмед, прошедший переподготовку на МиГ-25, остальным запретили участие в боевых операциях.
Наконец долгожданные МиГ-25 прибыли на АБ Хаббания (переброшены транспортными самолетами), были собраны и облетаны заводской командой. Но... снова произошла заминка - из Союза не прибыли летчики-инструкторы, которые должны были дать вывозные полеты. В результате МиГ-25 простаивали в капонирах, а летчики наблюдали как их коллеги из соседней эскадрильи уходят на боевые задания в сторону Ирана. В один из дней майор Абдулла Фарадж (комэск МиГ-25) и капитан Сальхи (его заместитель) совершили утреннюю разведку погоды на МиГ-21У, видимо они договорились между собой и сразу после посадки приказали инженеру эскадрильи готовить к вылету МиГ-25ПУ.
Командир АБ Хаббания полковник Фархан аль-Мутлак был разбужен ревом двигателей взлетавшего МиГ-25 и в недоумении связался с КП. Узнав о самовольном вылете на новом самолете он приказал немедленно возвращаться и доложил о происшествии Командующему ВВС. Летчикам грозили серьезные неприятности, но лично Саддам Хуссейн, узнавший о происшествии, дал разрешение на полеты без советских инструкторов и похвалил "своих соколов" за инициативу.
Кстати, 3-го мая 1982 года именно п/п-к Абдулла Фарадж на МиГ-25ПД случайно сбил алжирский Learjet с министром иностранных дел Мохаммедом Беняхия на борту. Инцидент произошел во время ночного перехвата пары иранских F-5, которые часто прятались под "гражданский траффик". В упавшем у Котура самолете погибли 9 официальных лиц алжирской делегации, журналист и 4 члена экипажа.
Еще любопытный отрывок из Тома Купера:The IrAF Kari system lost a lot of its integrity already during the first night of the war. The major early warning station covering southern Iraq - i.e. the corridor from Riyad towards Baghdad - was knocked out and so were all the local GCI centres. Nevertheless, the IrAF re-organized a part of that system with help of mobile systems and then launched the first of its only two "counter-offensives" - exactly on the 19th January. According to Iraqis, this offensive resulted in downing of several US and allied aircraft: strangely enough, however, while the official US and allied sources "confirmed" most of these, they admitted them as occurring on entirely different dates... Thus, most of the Iraqi claims from this day remain "unconfirmed" - at least in the public...
Anyway, the two MiG-29s encountered by Pitts and Tollini were not there to fight, but to act as decoys. And that's exactly what they did: they drew the attention of US pilots away from a pair of MiG-25s, so the latter could approach undisturbed before initiating their own attack.
The latter two also did not confront the F-15s "frontally", but flew a highly successful "beam" manoeuvre, which resulted in both USAF Eagles losing a lock-on and thus the Sparrow firing solution for them. That's why Pitts and Tollini could not engage the Foxbats with Sparrows (nor Sidewinders) from head on.
The problem was the distance from the Iraqi radar station that monitored that operation, and the US jamming of Iraqi radars and comms. This resulted in the GCI advising the two MiG-25 pilots to turn back into their targets too early: because of this, they re-appeared in front, and not in the flank of the two USAF fighter, lost the situational awarness and were subsequently both shot down.
This example became a "classic" in the IrAF and was subsequently taught to all fighter-interceptor pilots by the Flying Leaders School IrAF.
Learning their lessons, the Iraqis launched another such operation something like two weeks later. They used MiG-29s again as baits, and vectored two MiG-25s on the F-15s, their pilots claiming one of Eagles as hit by an R-40RD. Both MiG-25s came away unscatched. One of remaining Iraqi EW-stations then tracked that F-15 in flight back towards the Saudi border, during which it was constantly losing speed and height. The Iraqis calculated that the plane must've crashed some 40km south of the border. Their intel later found the crash site but only few small bits of wreckage were left there. Nevertheless, the MiG-25 pilot in question was credited with a confirmed kill.
This operation, named "Samarrah", also became a "classic" within the IrAF...The USAF never found it worth even mentioning this Iraqi claim in any of its published statements...
_________________
Tom Cooper
Editor, ACIG.orgа Купера
Avon wrote:
Tom, the MiG-29s acting as decoys were considered far more of a threat than the MiG-25s.
Well, that was the US point of view: the Iraqi POV was directly opposite. They a) did not consider MiG-29s worth much more than MiG-23s, and b) knew the Americans were going after MiG-29s at every opportunity, thus the two MiG-29 in this case were there as decoys.
Quote:
Did the MiG-25s lose visual contact with the F-15s?
Adrian, sorry but you don't have a visual with any kind of targets when flying a MiG-25. If you do, something went wrong - or you're intercepting a big transport aircraft.
Ahmad Rushdi
Honourable Member
Joined: 17 Jan 2005
Posts: 376
Location: BAGHDAD
Posted: Thu Oct 06, 2005 11:48 am Post subject:
Crossiathh,
In 1982 the first Mig-23MFs were delivered to Iraq, with them came the R-23R/T missiles. Iraqi MF carried both R-23R/T at the same time. Iraqi MF were equipped with Saphir-23 radar which was generations ahead of the radar onboard the Mig-21bis/Mig-23MS. In 1983, the Mig-23MFs were participating in the air war with Iran on the southern front. They locked on Iranian fighters from ranges of 30-35 kilometers. 1983 was not a busy year for the air war, so few air clashes between Iraqi and Iranian aircraft occurred, very few, maybe less than 5 R-23s were fired claiming 2-3 Iranian F-4s and F-5s. It was here that the Iranians radar started to warn Iranian pilots to make evasive maneuvers at a distance of 25 kilometers from Iraqi aircraft. In cases when there were no Iranian radar coverage the Iranian F-4E or F-5E was lost to Iraqi missiles. The problem for Iranian fighters was that their RWR didn't incorporate any identification for the Mig-23MF and Mig-23ML radar. It also didn’t have any way of determining that an R-23R/R-24R missile was fired towards them. The tendency for Iranian radars was to withdraw Iranian fighters appeared in the area. Sometimes the Iranians were determined in accomplishing some tasks such as a high altitude photo-reconnaissance missions using RF-4E; usually conducted at an altitude of 11-12 kilometer. To ensure that the Iranian plane is shot down two pairs of Iraqi fighters were used to sandwich the unarmed Phantom. The leader of each Iraqi pair would launch an R-24R. This would ensure that the RF-4 is shot down. In one case the sandwich was conducted using a Mig-21 in which the leader fired an R-13M and the other pair which was a MIg-23ML; the leader fired an R-24R. The latter hit the Iranian Phantom. It plunged to ground from high altitude and its two occupants managed to bail out.
In July 1984 the 63 squadron was equipped with Mig-23ML. During various skirmishes over Iranian territory and waters 1984-1988 the Mig-23ML managed to shoot down several F-4 Phantoms using R-24Rs. One Iranian F-4E was shot down by an Iraqi Mig-23ML using an R-24R, the missile was launched from about 20 km range and hit the cockpit of the Iranian Phantom killing its pilot and badly injuring the RIO who managed to eject. The incident occurred near Dezful in late autumn 1985. Iranian GCI usually never let their aircraft reach to a distance less than 30Km from Iraqi fighters. Total Iraqi R-24 fired would not exceed 50 by any way.
Constant maneuvering were adopted by Iranian fighters mainly F-4s and F-14s to avoid the clash with Iraqi Mig-23MLs. Iraqi Mig-23s became the backbone of the Iraqi interceptor force after 1984, however they were late comers to the show, by 1984 the backbone of the IRIAF was broken, air superiority was gained. Iraqi Mig-23s were conducting routine CAP over the northern part of the Gulf, and over the Iranian cities of Ahvaz, Dezful and Kermanshah with no challenge from either the Iranian jets or air defense. To attest to their capabilities during 1983-1988 only one Mig-23MF and another Mig-23ML were lost to various Iranian assets
Это опять с сайта Тома Купера.Здесь упоминаются победы над RF-4E и F-4E,сбитый в районе Дизфуля в августе 1985 года.В обоих случаях я не нашел подтверждения
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